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ABSTRACT 
The continuing division of the Korean Peninsula is the ongoing feature in inter-Korean 
relations, with repeating cycles of confrontations and conciliations. This thesis identifies 
contributing factors to the ongoing division from the intricately entangled security 
relations between the U.S., PRC, ROK and DPRK: rivalry and alliance. While struggling 
for security, they become either a security provider or a threat to other players. Each 
relational linkage provides an imperative security framework for the two Koreas, but 
these also have paradoxical security implications—“two dilemmas”—for inter-Korean 
reconciliation.   
In the relations of two sets of rivalries—the U.S.–PRC and the ROK–DPRK, the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma explains how the rational player’s interest-seeking behavior 
produces deadlock, even though reconciliation provides better results. Also, in the 
relations of two sets of alliances, the U.S.–ROK and the PRC–DPRK, the alliance 
security dilemma explains how divergent interests and threat perceptions between allies 
work against any reconciliation policy. Moreover, the interaction of rivalry and alliance 
produces paradoxical security dynamics among the four players, and drives them into the 
vicious cycle of confrontations. In short, these intricately intertwined and dilemma-
contained security relations induce significant conflict between the four players for either 
confrontational or conciliatory policies. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
For more than sixty years, the Korea Peninsula has been divided into two halves 
in the context of the Cold War structure. Following the division of the peninsula after 
World War II, the two Koreas served as advance guards for the communist and free-
world camps during the Cold War era. The Korean War severely separated the South and 
North, and each has maintained animosity toward its counterpart, struggling and 
competing for superiority of ideology and regime in the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the 
divided peninsula has always been a center of conflict in international relations and the 
recipient of great scrutiny from its strong neighbors. However, despite the internal and 
external tensions and confrontations in the peninsula, the peace and stability in the 
peninsula has been successfully managed without a major conflict triggering the second 
Korean War.  
On the other hand, unlike Germany, the status of the two Koreas—allies of the 
U.S. and Soviet Union, respectively—has not been significantly changed, even after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Both Koreas are left as remnants of the Cold War, 
remaining technically at war without the peace agreement. Also, the diverse, extensive 
internal and external efforts for reconciliation and challenges to fix the North Korean 
problems seemingly have failed to result in further changes. The Korean Peninsula 
continuously “moved in a repeated cycle of reconciliation, improvement, confrontation 
and exacerbation,”1 but could not generate the meaningful results. 
This continued conflict and stability seems to be the ongoing feature of the 
Korean Peninsula. In this respect, the main purpose of this thesis is to identify and 
understand why and how the Korean Peninsula has maintained the stability and conflict 
with the simultaneous continuity of the division, and under what circumstances it will 
possibly modify the status quo and generate meaningful changes. 
                                                 
1 Tong Hui Ma, “Reunification of Korea is a Major Security Issue on the Korean Peninsula: The North 
Korean Perspective,” Asia Paper (October 2010), 6. 
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B. IMPORTANCE AND PROBLEMS 
No one can deny that inter-Korean relations are an internal matter, and should be 
addressed by the Koreans themselves. However, it is also an intricately intertwined 
regional security issue interconnected with both Koreas’ aspirations for guaranteeing 
security and the strategic interests of external powers, especially the United States and 
China. Thus, the relationship of both Koreas has dynamics that cannot easily be separated 
from an intricately entangled interplay of extra and intra factors. In other words, the 
relationship between the two Koreas has long been not only a dependent variable of the 
international security environment, but also a bilaterally competitive, ideological struggle. 
Thus, without a comprehensive understanding of the complicated interplay of external 
and internal factors, drawing out a valid policy leading to fundamental changes between 
both Koreas is difficult.  
Political decisions and approaches to inter-Korean relations, however, have often 
emphasized one side of those aspects. Even though the attempts and efforts at inter-
Korean engagement inside and outside both countries seemed to produce some 
improvement, those often revealed limitations when confronted with other aspects and 
dimensions of the problems, the bilaterally wary attitudes, and external pressures applied 
by interests of neighboring states. For example, progressive governments, the Kim Dae 
Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations, from the late-1990s to mid-2000s, ambitiously 
carried out “Sunshine Policy” for reconciliation with North Korea. However, despite 
some advancement in the relationship, the policy revealed the limitation when it faced 
paradoxical internal and external problems. Firstly, the policy could not prevent North 
Korea’s nuclear program and provocations, despite the unconditional economic aid. Also, 
it brought concerns over estrangement of the U.S.–ROK relations while revealing 
divergent attitudes toward the DPRK nuclear program. Furthermore, the South failed to 
draw out China’s full cooperation to influence the DPRK issues despite the raised 
bilateral relations along with economic interdependence. 
As the case shows, in order to understand the failure and the deadlocked relations, 
and at least draw out valid policies, more insight is needed into the internal and external 
factors contributing to the maintenance of the status quo and the interaction of those 
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forces. In this respect, this thesis focuses on identifying the crucial internal and external 
factors and the dynamics contributing to the ongoing division.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The primary focus of this research is identifying the dynamics and factors 
contributing to the continuity of the status quo. However, discriminating and classifying 
those factors are cumbersome because of the diverse layers of analysis, which are too 
intricately intertwined to explain individually. Also, there is an enormous amount of 
literature dealing with and containing causes and prospects of the inter-Korean relations. 
Thus, in order to identify these complex factors effectively, this thesis classifies these 
according to two main bodies of literature: external (beyond inter-Korean level) and 
internal factors (inter-Korean bilateral level). Due to its diverse perspectives and 
extensive discussions on these issues, this paper does not address all viewpoints found in 
the literature. It primarily focuses on influential factors researchers regard in their 
respective paper. 
1. Influential Factors: International Level (External Factors) 
Generally, it is believed that external factors influencing the Korean Peninsula are 
derived from attitudes and relations of major powers in Northeast Asia: the U.S., China, 
Japan, and Russia. Basically, these countries have interests in fundamental issues in the 
Korean Peninsula, such as “the nature of the North Korean regime, the desirable end state 
on the Korean Peninsula, and the roadmap and action plan for reaching that end state.”2 
In this respect, this paper narrows down diverse issues related to external factors into 
three main categories: the major powers’ (1) strategic interest, (2) mutual relationship and 
perception, (3) relationship with and security policy toward the two Koreas.   
First of all, scholars point out the major powers’ respective national interest has 
them approach the two Koreas differently. Profoundly, divergent interests of those states 
collide with each other and make dissonance while pursuing their respective policies 
                                                 
2 Kang Choi and Minsung Kim, “An Assessment of the Security Environment and Challenges in the 
Post-Cheonan Era: A South Korean Perspective,” International Journal of Korean Unification 19, no. 2 
(2010): 88–124. 
 4
toward the Korean Peninsula. The most frequently discussed main strategic interest is 
derived from the geopolitical location of the Korean Peninsula. Because of the location, 
the U.S. wishes to maintain its preponderance3 and its military presence while keeping 
the Korean Peninsula under the nuclear umbrella.4 On the other hand, China does not 
want to lose North Korea, which serves as a strategic buffer against the U.S. influence. 5 
If it has to, China will want to gain additional influence and reduce the number of U.S. 
military bases on the Korean Peninsula.6 Japan prefers the retention of the status quo on 
the peninsula with a non-nuclear North.7 If it should accept, Japan wants the unified 
Korea as a part of a U.S.-led alliance system.8  Russia may take an active diplomatic 
approach toward the Korean Peninsula to seek to regain some of the influence.9 
The second category is the significance of major powers’ relationship, distribution 
of power, and international structure around the Korean Peninsula. Whenever there was 
tension or a détente mood among major powers in the region, both Koreas’ strategic 
calculation were also pressured or changed accordingly. Thus, numerous research reports 
note the impact of the relations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China 
during the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula. Also, since the end of the Cold War, U.S.-
China relations, along with the China’s ascent, have become the focal point influencing 
the Korean Peninsula.10 According to the diverse and different prospects—pessimistic 
and optimistic—about U.S.-China relations, there are many prospects for the inter-
Korean relations. Among explanations, the power transition theory predicts that the 
                                                 
3 Jonathan D. Pollack and Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and 
Implications,  MR-1040-A, Rand Corporation, 1999, 6. 
4 Derek J. Mitchell, “A Blueprint for U.S. Policy toward a Unified Korea,” The Washington Quarterly 
6, no 1 (Winter 2002–03), 132. 
5 Charles L. Pritchard, “Korean Reunification: Implications for the United States and Northeast Asia,” 
January 13, 2005, The Brookings Institution, 7. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Joungwon Alexander Kim and Myungshin Hong, “The Koreas, Unification and the Great Powers,” 
Current History, April 2006, 188. 
8 Mitchell, U.S. Policy toward Unified Korea, 128. 
9 Joseph P. Ferguson, “Russia’s Role on the Korean Peninsula and Great Power Relations in Northeast 
Asia: Ramifications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” NBR Analysis 14, no. 1 (2003), 4. 
10 Fei-Ling Wang, “Stability with Uncertainties: U. S.-China Relations and the Korean Peninsula,” 
Pacific Focus 20, issue 1 (March  2005): 93–134. 
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hegemonic competition between two superpowers will further separate the two Koreas. 
Besides, some of the literature touches on impacts of historical rivalry and nationalism 
between Sino and Japan, U.S.–Japan security alliance, and U.S. efforts to draw Korea 
into the trilateral alliance system.11 
The third category is the bilateral relationship with and security policy toward the 
North and South. Firstly, both Koreas have respectively strong security ties with the 
United States and China. As a strong ally of South Korea, the U.S. stations military, 
guarantees security of ROK and deters North Korean military ambition, but the North 
perceives it as a major threat to their survival.12 Also, China and North Korea have 
maintained a long security alliance. Even though the relationship is not as strong as the 
U.S.–ROK alliance, the China-DPRK alliance provides significant means for survival to 
DPRK and influences the status quo. Secondly, some researchers deal with the profound 
changes between U.S.–ROK and PRC-ROK relations: the convergence between China-
ROK relations with economic interdependence and divergence between U.S.–ROK 
relations with democratization of the South. Also, there is much literature that points out 
the influence of security policies toward the North Korean problems, such as U.S. and 
Chinese policies toward the North Korean nuclear development and missile program, and 
divergent and convergent attitudes on its impact.13 
2. Influential Factors: Internal Factors (Including Domestic Factors) 
A great deal of research examines repercussions on the inter-Korean engagement 
from both Koreas’ bilateral and domestic attributes. On the one hand, those scholars point 
out the characteristics of the inter-Korean rivalry, relative national power, and the 
engagement policy. Most profoundly, inter-Korean relations are driven by the legitimacy 
                                                 
11 Richard Weitz, “The Korean Pivot: Challenges and Opportunities from Evolving Chinese-Russian 
and U.S.-Japanese Security Ties,” Academic Paper Series 1, no 3 (March 2007): 1–20. 
12 Leon Sigal, Disarming the Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1998),  21. 
13 Information on U.S. and China policies toward the North Korean nuclear program: Christopher P. 
Twomey, “China Policy Towards North Korea and its Implications for the United States: Balancing 
Competing Concerns,” Strategic Insights V, issue 7 (September 2006), Wade l. Huntley, “North Korea 
Nuclear Crisis,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Summer 2004): 81–115.,Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, 
“The Korea Crisis,” Foreign Policy (May/June 2003). 
 6
and ideological competition since the Korean War.14 Security concerns and experiences 
of the war have inspired both to build up a large military force and to keep a tight 
vigilance against each other. As one pillar of influential factors, the South Korean 
government has carried out proactive policies toward North Korea with its superior 
economic capability since 1990s. Depending on the inclination of government and its 
policies, Pyongyang differently responded with respect to Seoul’s policy. Also, as 
democracy becomes more consolidated in South Korea, the popular sentiment and public 
opinion about North Korea is becoming a more important factor for the policy.15  
On the other hand, numerous scholars find impediments for the inter-Korean 
engagement from the distinctive rigidity of North Korean regime. First of all, North 
Korea is the sole Stalinist country in the world equipped with the militarism (military first 
policy, Songun) and Juche ideology. Experts note Juche is an “ideological construct” of 
self-reliance and national identity.16 Due to its religious characteristics, it may bring 
about “severe social conflict and psychological depression in the process of 
reunification.”17 Secondly, the Kim Jong-Il regime’s concerns over the regime survival 
became a primary explanation of its behavior and policies. Behind these concerns, 
scholars estimate economic crisis, losing traditional allies, and falling behind the regime 
competition since the end of the Cold War.18 Along with the regime survival, the nuclear 
development and the negotiations for denuclearization brought diverse and extensive 
controversies and influences on the region and inter-Korean relations. In addition, some 
                                                 
14 Jonathan D. Pollack, “Korean Unification: Illusion or Aspiration?” The Brown Journal of World 
Affairs VIII, Issue 1 (Winter/Spring 2001): 77–90. 
15 Myoung-Kyu Park and Philo Kim, “Inter-Korean Relations In Nuclear Politics,” Asian Perspective 
34, no.1 (2010): 111-135. 
16 L Mitchell Lerner, “A failure of perception: Lyndon Johnson, North Korean ideology, and the 
Pueblo incident,” Diplomatic History 25, no. 4 (October 1, 2001): 647.  
17 Philo Kim, “An Analysis Of Religious Forms Of Juche Ideology In Comparison With Christianity,” 
International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 11, no. 1 (2002). 
18  Han S. Park, “North Korean Perceptions of Self and Others: Implications for Policy,” Pacific 
Affairs 73, no. 4 Special Issue: Korea in Flux (Winter 2000-2001):503–516. 
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articles argue the Kim Jong-Il’s health and the succession issue are important variables of 
North Korean behavior today.19 
This section attempts to explore the existing literature dealing with probable 
factors influencing the continuity of the division. In general, the existing literature in this 
area is very diverse and quite extensive in scope. There seem to be a large amount of 
resources available, particularly in the field of the external and internal factors that 
influence both Korean relations. These factors are summed up in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Potential Sources of Influential Factors on the Inter-Korean engagement 
In contrast, the overall weakness of the source material is that there are few 
research reports that measure the relative intensity of the influence of these factors, and 
systemically connects those to explain the interconnectedness of diverse aspects of the 
Korean issues. The majority of literature focuses primarily on analyzing individual 
factors and their influence on the peninsula. Even though this approach provides 
plausible explanations in the specific aspect, it does not help to understand the 
comprehensive feature of the continuity of division on the Korean Peninsula. The 
majority of the literature only emphasizes the importance of the interplay of the external 
                                                 
19  Jinwook Choi, “Why is North Korea so Aggressive? Kim Jong-Il’s Illness and North Korea's 
Changing Governing Style,” Policy Forum Online 09-062A (2009): 1–4. 
Internal Factors 
External Factors  
South Korea North Korea 
The Legitimacy and Ideological Competition 
Military buildup (Nuclear Weapon) 
Relative National Power 
Ethnic and Nationalistic Identity (getting fade) 
Domestic Factors 
Major powers’ Strategic interest 
Major Powers’ Relationship 
 - U.S.-China Rivalry 
 - U.S.-ROK- DPRK relations 
 - China-ROK-DPRK relations 
 - Japan-ROK-DPRK relations 
Major powers’ policy toward Koreas 
 -  Nuclear and Missile issues 
Policy toward North Korea 
  - Sunshine policy 




- Juche ideology 
- Militarism 
Regime survival 
- Economic crisis 
- Losing traditional allies 
Kim Jong-Il health and 
Succession 
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and internal factors to supplement their respective theory, but they do not provide a 
specific explanation of it. 20 
Only a few research reports profess the importance of systemic approaches to the 
external and internal factors. Even prominent scholars—such as Victor Cha and Jonathan 
Pollack—have not focused on the interactions between internal-external and alliance-
rivalry and its influence on the peninsula despite they generally recognizes the problem. 
For example, Cha explains the correlations of U.S.’s commitment (external) with the 
relations between South Korea and Japan (internal) in his one of articles.21 Also, some 
Korean scholars suggest insightful methodologies. The most representative research 
focuses on “the division system theories” reflecting the uniqueness of the South-North 
relations. According to Nak-chung Paik, who is a left-wing scholar, the ruling classes of 
both Koreas have exploited the antagonism in the inter-Korean relations in order to 
consolidate their respective regime. Thus, if this kind of the governance structure is 
consolidated, overcoming the continuity of the Korean Peninsula becomes more difficult 
because of the interconnectedness with the domestic politics. From Paik’s perspective, 
the Korean reunification is only possible when civil powers overcome the internal 
contradictions of the ruling political system.22 Chong-suk Lee and Myong-rim Park also 
emphasize the interconnectedness of the inter-Korean relations by adopting concepts of 
“antagonistic interdependence,” “mirror image effect” and “interfacial dynamics.” 
Despite the antagonistic attitudes toward each other, both Koreas’ authoritarian regimes 
intensified the dependence of their counterpart’s existence in order to supplement their 
lack of legitimacy. 23 Those division system theories have great significance in the sense 
of theorizing structural and systemic aspects of inter-Korean relations. However, those 
                                                 
20 Choi and Kang.; Young Whan Kihl, “Security on the Korean Peninsula: Continuity and Change,” 
Security Dialogue 33, no. 1 (March 2002): 59–72. 
21 Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, 
Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly, 44, no. 2 (June 2000), 261–291. 
22Nak-chung Paik, “Toward a perception of the division system,” Paik, ed., In The Path of Practice for 
Transforming the Division System (Seoul, Changbi, 1994), 13–40. 
23 Chong-suk Lee, “the Inter-Korean relations and Domestic Politics in the post-Cold War period,” 
Ki-duk Park, ed., Ten years of the Korean Democracy: Changes and Continuities (Seoul, Sejong Institute, 
1998) ; Myung-rim Park, “The Structure and Changes in the Order of Division: the Interfacial Dynamics of 
Antagonism and Dependence, 1945~1995,” National Strategy 3, no.1 (1997): 41–79 
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theories still do not explain the relations of the internal and external factors. In this 
respect, this research will attempt to address gaps in the current literature, specifically 
with respect to verifying the interplay of external and internal factors contributing to the 
continuity of the division of the Korean Peninsula. 
D. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
1. Presumption of the Thesis 
Identifying the influence and interplay of the external and internal factors is a 
challenging task. This is not only because of the relatively small number of prior research 
studies that have touched on the relevant issues, but also because it is difficult to measure 
working forces of these factors and its repercussions. In order to measure these influences 
effectively and simplify the dynamics of internal and external factors, this paper 
primarily adopts the neo-realist approach to explain the behavioral pattern of states. This 
is because even though various and diverse factors have influences on the inter-Korean 
relations, the main factors contributing to continuity of the division fundamentally rest on 
realpolitik issues, such as the security concern, distrust, and misperception. Also, the 
absence of the norms and multilateral institutions enabling regulation of stakeholders’ 
behaviors make a realistic approach more dominant in the division issue, rather than 
liberal and constructive ideas. Thus, this approach helps to narrow down the analytical 
area to the strategic decision makers, who prioritize and pursue the national goal with 
respect to interests. 
In this respect, the foundation of the thesis is based on the following core 
concepts of the realist theory. As Waltz argues, because of the “anarchical” 
characteristics of the international system, states seek power in order to ensure their 
survival. 24 Therefore, without self-help and pursuing power, states can lose their security 
and prosperity or become subservient to the will of others. Thus, states must prepare the 
                                                 
24 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 114. 
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various means against threats, especially by increasing their military strength or forming 
alliances. The basis this thesis follows is:25 
1. States are the most important actors in world politics. Thus, world 
politics can be analyzed as if states were unitary rational actors seeking 
to maximize their expected utility. However, domestic groups influence 
the decision-making process. 
2. States are instrumentally rational and motivated primarily by their 
national interests. Thus, states adopt instrumentally rational policies in 
their pursuit of power or security. 
3. Calculations based on these necessities can reveal the policies that will 
best serve a state’s interests.  
4. No state can ever be certain another state will not use its offensive 
military capability.  
With those premises, international politics surrounding the Korean Peninsula can 
be understood as the rational analysis of competing interests defined in terms of power. 
Also, the continuity of the division of the Korean Peninsula would be understood as by-
products derived from competing interests. 
2. Relational Links Influencing the Inter-Korean Relations 
Since the end of the Cold War, the international structure of East Asia has been 
restructured around the Sino–U.S. relations. Also, both countries are patrons who support 
their respective client: South and North Korea. With regard to the intensity of influence 
stemming from security and political ties, the U.S. and China are therefore the biggest 
external players affecting the inter-Korean reconciliation process. Even though other 
external powers, Russia and Japan, are also an important and influential variable, their 
current role is generally regarded as the subordinate position. Thus, this paper focuses on 
the PRC and the United States. Also, it refers the internal powers to South and North 
Korea.  
                                                 
25 Ibid., 117.; John J. Mearsheimer “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International 
Security 19, no.3 (1994/95), 9–10. 
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Figure 1.  Linkages of Relations and Influential Force 
If these four players’ relations are represented schematically, the distribution of 
power and relational links can be illustrated as in Figure 1. Those links shows that an 
intimate and interdependent relationship of four countries whose influence creates a 
series of incentives and constraints for cooperative and conflictual behaviors. Often, “the 
interaction between two states and influences is influenced by” the presence of a third 
actor or party. In the relational linkages, interstate behavioral exchanges mutually 
influence not only to a targeted state but other states having links with it. In other words, 
external and internal influences are not an isolated issue, so all need to understand each 
relational link and its influences. 
Figure 1 also presents the equilibrium of balance of power sustained by two 
distinctive realistic ideas: rivalry and alliance. Those four states struggle for their security 
and survival, and it drives other players into either a security provider or a threat.  Also, 
each state’s perceived strategic gains and losses often reinforce each other in 
consolidating the persistence of balance of power between those states. 26  This 
configuration and relational links of four countries shows that the interdependence and 
dynamics of the entangled rivals and allies are very influential factors contributing to the 
continuity of the division of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, in order to understand the 
                                                 
26Conception of interdependence casual force refers to:  Yu-Shan Wu, “Exploring Dual Triangles: The 
Development of Taipei-Washington-Beijing Relations,” Issues and Studies 32, no. 10 (October 1996), 26–
52.  
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continued division problem, one needs to understand how (1) rivalry and (2) alliance and 
(3) the interplay of alliances and rivalries influence the inter-Korea reconciliation process. 
3. The Inter-Korean Relations in the Context of Rivalries and Alliances  
Ironically, in the relations of rivalries and alliances, there are dilemmatic issues: 
Prisoners’ Dilemma in rivalries and Alliance Security Dilemma for allies. These 
dilemmatic issues produce the paradoxical problems for the reconciliation. Therefore, this 
paper explores rivalries and alliances along with those theories to verify their influence 
on the reconciliation process. In order to examine those influences effectively, this thesis 
conveniently divides contents into three main sections: two rivalries, two alliances and 
the interplay of rivalries and alliance.  
First of all, it investigates the U.S.-China and ROK-DPRK rivalries and their 
influence on inter-Korean relations and reconciliation. Both rivalries have been doing 
adversary games with respect to the relative gains and losses. This delicate security 
dilemma produces different priorities and interests approaching the Korean reunification 
(as shown in Figure 2.) Thus, in order to figure out the deadlock for the reunification in 
both rivalries, this thesis uses Prisoner’s Dilemma game theory as a main tool. For the 
rivalry relations, the Prisoner’s Dilemma theory helps to explain how a rational player’s 
behaviors seeking national interest produce deadlock even though there is a better result 
when they cooperate. According to the theory, it is possible to understand the deadlock 
by defining four players’ national interest and strategy related to the Korean Peninsula. 
 
Figure 2.  Rivalries’ Deadlock for Reunification 
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Secondly, this thesis also focuses on the divergent approaches from the allies. The 
security environmental changes in the post-Cold War era, both allies within the U.S.-
ROK and PRC-DPRK have divergent and convergent interests on the reunification, and it 
makes it difficult to maintain consistent approaches toward the reunification issues (as 
shown Figure 3). In order to examine the allies’ wedged interests toward the peninsula 
and its influence, this paper adopts “alliance security dilemma” theory, which is 
suggested by Snyder. 27  The alliance dilemma theory explains that when allies have 
divergent interest and thereat perception, they have two different types of fears of 
“entrapment and abandonment.” According to the theory, allies tend to focus alliance 
more on their respective security priority whereas they are reluctant to take undesired 
costs by being entrapped in allies’ security affairs. This concept of security dilemma is a 
useful tool to understand the different attitudes of U.S.-ROK toward the Sunshine policy 
and the North Korean nuclear program which their security perspective were significantly 
diverged. 
 
Figure 3.  Divergent Interests between Allies and Different Approach to Reunification 
Finally, and most importantly, this thesis explains the four players’ paradoxical 
relations when it combines those two theories into the Korean reunification issues. As 
noted above, each of external and internal powers has been involved in respective rivalry 
and alliance with respect to national interests, thus both security relations fundamentally 
drives to choose the security strategies. However, in the process of executing strategy, it 
                                                 
27 Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 5, (July 
1984): 461–495. 
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not only influences the relationship of the targeted player but also becomes a basis of the 
other players’ strategic calculation. Indeed, the dynamics of the strategic calculations are 
illustrated as Figure 4. 
In these complicated strategic relations, it can find that the four players are closed 
interconnected with the adversary and alliance at the same time. Thus, it has produces 
distinctive security dynamics between the four players. For example, a North Korean 
provocation not only has negative impacts on the inter-Korean reconciliation process, but 
also helps the U.S.–ROK alliance to be concretely united and for China to use it as an 
opportunity to exert its influence on the region. In other words, to some extent, those 
countries have dependence on the North Korean provocation in their own terms, and it 
consolidates the current status quo and the persistence of the continuity of the Korean 
Peninsula. In this regard, this thesis needs to investigate whether those dependences 
produce vicious cycles of tensions and prevent the reconciliation process from the inter-
Korean relations. In order to explain such paradoxical issues, this paper uses “alliance-
adversary game” which suggest the interconnectedness between the two sets of the 
alliances and rivalries and “antagonistic dependence theory” that explains the dependence 
of the four players on the tension and conflictual relations.  
Figure 4.  The Dynamics of Strategic Calculations between Internal and External Players 
In the following chapters, this paper thoroughly explores national interests, 
strategies, dynamics and related theories of four players to explain the continuity of the 
division in the Korean Peninsula, but it would need enormous and broad data and 
The U.S. and PRC 
External 
 Internal 
The ROK and DPRK  
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explanations. In order to avoid such a problem, this paper mainly focuses on the post-
Cold War period, besides explaining the historical background, and limits discussions 
strictly to the inter-Korean-oriented issues specifically supporting the ideas, such as 
different approaches in the Sunshine policy and Nuclear Program. In addition, for the 
purpose of the effective explanations of the three dilemmatic issues suggested above, 
each chapter succinctly explains related theories and their relevant concept on the issue, 
then addresses the problems, and interprets those with the theories.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis contains five chapters. This first chapter briefly explained the research 
question and importance, and introduced hypothesis and methodology of the case study 
to examine the intensity of influence of the external and internal factors. Chapter II 
suggests how the problematic rivalries prevent the reconciliation from happening by 
applying the Prisoner’s Dilemma theory. After introducing the core concept of the theory, 
this chapter provides an overview of the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula for 
strong powers in the post-Cold War era, and the unique relations between the South and 
North, to illustrate the profound difference the four players’ interest. Then, it addresses 
the deadlock in the inter-Korean relation in terms of explanation of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. Chapter III briefly introduces the main conception alliance theories and the 
Alliance Security Dilemma theory, and shows how it applies to the Korean Peninsula 
situation. To support the idea, this chapter also provides an overview of the U.S.–ROK 
and PRC-DPRK alliance and security environment changes in the post-Cold War era. 
Then, it addresses the implication of the alliance security dilemmas on the inter-Korean 
relations. As noted above, the main purpose of Chapter IV is to discuss the paradoxical 
relations of those four players. In order to explain these dilemmatic relations, this chapter 
briefly introduces “the alliance and adversary game theory” and the antagonistic 
interdependence theory. Then, it adopts two recent and most notable incidents, the 
“ROKS Cheonan sinking” and the “Bombardment of Yeonpyeong,” in order to support 
the previous theories and show the paradoxical relations between the four players. As the 
conclusion sector, Chapter V analyzes those data collected from previous chapters to 
explain the interplay of the external and internal factors. Also, it briefly shows that the 
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Korean Peninsula is intricately involved in the vicious cycle of dilemmas. Based on such 




II. TWO RIVALRIES AND PRISONERS’ DILEMMA IN THE 
KOREAN PENINSULA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the division of the Korean Peninsula, South and North Korea have 
maintained rivalry relations in the context of the Cold War structure. The two Koreas 
took part in the two different regional groups of states: one in the Maritime Trilateral 
powers and the other in the Continental Trilateral powers.28 Therefore, as these two 
group’s confrontation deepened, the conflict and enmity between the two Koreas were 
intensified. While these two sets of rivalries have facilitated conflicts and confrontations, 
the stability of the Korean Peninsula has been maintained in the context of regional 
balance of power,29 but animosity and distrust were further consolidated. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the U.S.-U.S.S.R bipolar structure was eventually replaced by the U.S.-
PRC rivalry. In this newly emerged regional structure, the two Koreas still have taken an 
important strategic role counterbalancing the adversary group. Then, the inter-Korean 
rivalry becomes closely connected to the regional confrontation led by the U.S. and PRC. 
Therefore, the two sets of rivalries should be addressed whether they can reach consensus 
for inter-Korean reconciliation. 
On the other hand, the four players not only share security problems inflicting 
confrontations but also motivational factors providing greater benefits toward each other 
when they are cooperating. (i.e. cooperation for North Korean WMD between the U.S.-
PRC) Therefore, in this chapter, this paper finds the possibility of conciliation and 
cooperation between two sets of rivalries—the U.S-PRC and the ROK-DPRK—for the 
inter-Korean reconciliation, and which factors prevents rivalries from cooperating for 
common interest. In order to understand how the deadlock occurs between the two 
rivalries, this paper employs the Prisoner’s Dilemmas theory. For the effective 
explanation, this chapter introduces the applicability of the Prisoner’s Dilemma theory 
                                                 
28 G. John Ikenberry, "The Political Foundation of American Relations with East Asia," in The United 
States and Northeast Asia : Debates, Issues, and New Order, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon 
(Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 33–34. 
29 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
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briefly. Then, it investigates two sets of the rivalries’ strategic interests and concerns on 
the Korean peninsula as well as optimal condition for both sides. After that, in the last 
part, it applies the prisoner’s dilemma theory to the two sets of rivalries to examine the 
possibility of changes of the status of the peninsula and finds the reason for the deadlock 
between rivalries.  
B. THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: THE DEADLOCK OF THE 
RAPPROCHEMENT POLICIES 
1. General Concept of Game Theory and Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Game theory is the study of the interactive decision-making behavior in which 
strategic interactions among rational agents “produce outcomes with respect to the 
preferences of those agents, where the outcomes in question might have been intended by 
none of the agents.” 30  As a pioneer, John Von Neumann introduced first the 
mathematical game theory in the article “Theory of Parlor Games,” which proves the 
existence of the optimal strategy in the two-person zero-sum game.31 However, the initial 
efforts had limitations due to its applicability limited only under certain and special 
conditions. In reality, the number of interacting agents is often more than two, and non-
zero-sum is more commonly found, which is unclear about the winner or loser. During 
1950s, John Nash further refined the theory by successfully explaining the existence of 
sets of optimal strategies, called “Nash equilibria,” that players will have at least one if 
the strategies of the other players remain unchanged in the non-zero-sum game having 
more than two agents. 32 
The main insight of game theory is the understanding “strategic interactions.” 
Decision makers do not make decisions independently of one another; rather, they make 
choices based upon their anticipation of what other actors will likely do.33 In the game 
                                                 
30 “Game Theory,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/game-theory/ (accessed October 10, 2011). 
31 Dresher, Melvin, The Mathematics of Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications, (New York, 
NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 1981). 
32 Washburn, Alan R., Notes on Game Theory, Monterey, (CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 
2000), 26. 
33 Ngaire Woods, Explaining International Relations since 1945 (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 16. 
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theory, the most important standard of criterion of prediction is the player’s rationality in 
trying to do the best they can in order to maximize their return. However, often other 
player’s actions are not entirely predictable because of the uncertainties, such as players’ 
mistakes and dispersed or false information. 34  Thus, decision makers interact with 
opposing actors, choosing strategies to achieve the objective while taking into 
consideration the opposition’s strategies based on rationality and uncertainties as well.35  
Also, the main characteristics of the multi-person game derive from the 
interdependence that “any player in the game is affected by what others do; and in turn, 
that player’s actions affect the others.” Thus, “the outcome depends on everyone’s 
decisions; no one individual has full control over what happens.” 36 This dependence 
often generates unintended outcomes when the each player’s behavior is to maximize an 
individual interest. Thus, the optimal decision should be understood in the context of the 
interactive multi-person game and its final outcome. The important thing is that even in 
the fiercest competition, there always will be some common interests in cooperation 
when all participants agree in increasing the total amount of gains. Therefore, players are 
often faced with contradictory motives: the desire of growing a pie and the desire of 
having the largest share of it. Often, the player’s attempts to increase their own shares 
have a side effect of decreasing the cooperation to increase the benefits. Thus, among 
interacting agents, a tension always exists between seeking the total benefits, as opposed 
to merely seeking a large share of them.37 
2. Applicability of Prisoner’s Dilemma Theory on the Korean Peninsula 
In international relations, deadlock often occurs when two players fail to 
cooperate, even when there are strong incentives, because of insecurity, competition and 
                                                 
34 Philip D Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, (Washington D.C.: The Mathematical Association of 
America, 1993), 7. 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Ibid., 6. 
37 Jack Donnelly and '', Realism and International Relations [Electronic Resource] (Cambridge 
England; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 21. 
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conflict.38 The prisoner’s dilemma is the simplest game theory model enabling one to 
analyze such deadlock generated by “the political distance between desire and 
achievement.” 39  The theory provides an analytical tool that explains the important 
dilemma—states’ competition for their interests produces the mutually unintended 
consequences even when there is more preferable outcome for both sides. In this respect, 
the game theory is helpful to analyze the continuity of the division entangled in the 
confrontations of both rivalries.  
The prisoner’s dilemma theory is a hypothetical two-player nonzero-sum, non-
cooperative game in which the rational actors are seeking respective interests without 
communication prior to starting the game.40 In the theory, each actor has two available 
strategies, defection and cooperation, thus it has the four possible outcomes in such as the 
two-by-two games summarized in Table 2. 
 
Player 2 
 Cooperation (C) Defection (D) 
Cooperation (C) R, R S, T 
Player 1  
Defection (D) T, S P, P 
R=“Reward” (CC), T=“Temptation” (DC), S=“Sucker” (CD), P=“Penalty” (DD) 
T(DC) > R(CC) > P(DD) > S(CD) 
Table 2.   Generalized Payoff Matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
In the table, the first element of an entry in the table determines the payoff to 
Player 1, and the second entry determines the payoff to Player 2. In the game, the 
preference ordering of both players is always T>R>P>S with respect to the size of the 
benefits. The preference ordering creates the condition that the “Defection (T)” strategy 
always dominates the “Cooperation (R)” strategy for rational both players while seeking 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 22. 
40 R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions, (New York: John Wiley, 1957). 
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maximum interest.41  A typical pay-off structure of the Prisoner’s Dilemma looks like 
this: 
 
Table 3.   Example Payoffs for the Typical Prisoner’s Dilemma42 
In this game, the dilemma appears when both players should choose either one of 
the strategies, cooperate or defect. As illustrated in Table 3 (C, C), mutual cooperation, 
supplies a higher payoff for both players than (D, D), mutual defection.  Thus, it looks 
like the more reasonable strategic choices for both of them. However, the problem is that 
it is the second-best outcome for them, T>R; thus, each side would be tempted to choose 
defection in hopes of obtaining a larger individual payoff. Also, cooperation has the risk 
of getting suckered by the counterpart’s defection. In the relations in which mutual 
distrust or greedy desire exists, rational players will choose to defect even if they 
understand that cooperation brings more benefits. Thus, mutual defection is always the 
clear solution and the only strategically sensible outcome in the prisoner’s dilemma. 
However, it will always leave both players in a suboptimal position.  
3. Solving the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: Pursuing a Cooperation 
Strategy 
In this dilemmatic situation, without enforcer or other mechanisms that allow 
actors to risk cooperating, and without a procedure for achievement on how to divide the 
benefits of cooperation, both players may remain locked in a cycle, even a descending 
spiral, of competition. In this respect, generally there are two main categorizes for the 
solution.  
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
Player 2 
 C D 
C 3, 3 0, 5 
Player 1 
D 5, 0 1, 1 
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a. Changing the Characteristics of the Game 
First of all, the fundamental solution for the cooperation is changing the 
game’s characteristics itself. The most important thing is to eliminate conditions creating 
the Prisoners Dilemma between players: higher benefit of defection than that of 
cooperation, absence of communication, and absence of enforcement punishing a 
defector. Thus, the following measures increase the chances of achieving the mutual 
cooperation (R): 
(1) Increasing incentives to cooperate by increasing the payoffs of mutual 
cooperation (R) or decreasing the costs the actor by reducing the risk of 
being suckered (S) 
(2) Decreases the incentives for defecting by decreasing the gains of 
taking advantage of the other (T) and/or increasing the costs of mutual 
noncooperation (P) 
(3) Making a mutual cooperation pact and establishing some mechanism 
to enforce it 43 
Those changes in the structure of interaction or the preferences of the 
actors might evade the dilemma and make it less severe.  
b. Within the Prisoner’s Strategy 
The other important thing to overcome the Prisoner’s Dilemma is winning 
in the game. According to Thomas Oatley, if the following three conditions are met, 
cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma can emerge.44 First, if the same actors play the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game repeatedly over time rather than a single choice, cooperation 
possibly emerges due to its continuity. In this iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, repeated 
interaction makes players more responsible because actors must consider the 
consequences of defection in preceding turns of the game. Second, the actors must regard 
the future outcome or do not value future payoffs; there is more possibility of running the 
risk of reverting to a single prisoner’s dilemma game, which makes cooperation much 
                                                 
43 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, Issue 2 (January 
1978), 179–183. 
44Thomas Oatley, International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy, 
(New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008). 
 23
less rational. Finally, adopting the “tit-for-tat” strategy within the iterated game produces 
larger payoff than other strategies. When one player employs a tit-for-tat strategy, it will 
be a useful measure enforcing continued cooperation in each round of the game. 
Therefore in this came, cooperation can emerge from self-interested actors even in the 
Prisoners Dilemma situation if they expect to interact indefinitely. A typical tit-for-tat 
strategy is that of cooperating on its first move and then making the same choice 
thereafter that its opponent did on the previous move. Thus, if the game lasts long enough 
for retaliation, it can counteract the temptation to pursue an opposition player’s defection 
strategy by employing reciprocity. The essential factor in this argument is whether 
players emphasize the future gains possible from cooperating.  
C. THE U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS ON THE 
KOREAN PENINSULA 
1. Geo-Strategic Importance of the Korean Peninsula 
In international relations, “geography or geopolitics has long been the point of 
departure for studies of foreign policy or world politics.”45 For more than a century, the 
location of the Korean Peninsula has become a hot spot of a balance of power between 
strong powers competing for that control. The Korean Peninsula is located in the geo-
strategically and geopolitically unique position in Northeast Asia. It is the epicenter 
where the interests of four major powers intersect—the United States, the People's 
Republic of China, Russia, and Japan—to meet in one strategic area and the buffer zone 
where the big powers are prevented from direct collision. The unique strategic location 
sets it as both a threat and an opportunity for the four strong powers, which will 
determine a great deal of the balance of power in Northeast Asia. “The control of Korea 
by any one of the neighboring countries would constitute a serious security threat to the 
remaining powers.”46 Thus, any shifts of power in the region have greatly affected the 
status and policies of the neighboring powers. For these reasons, Korea has been in the 
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cockpit of nations that have sought regional dominance or the springboard to advance 
toward continents or oceans for centuries. Thus, the historically popular term in 
international relations for describing the status of Korea is “shrimp among whales.” 
While these countries seek to maximize their interests and reduce threats, its dynamics 
produces certain pattern of behaviors between these countries.  
Thus, the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula largely depends on how 
much the strong powers value Korea’s importance as a pawn to balance or check the 
other powers. Thus, the intensity of the attention and intervention varies according to the 
good and bad relations between external powers, currently the U.S. and PRC. Since the 
Korean War, bloody struggles against each other for both sides, U.S.-China relations 
appear to closely relate to the issues of the Korean Peninsula.  
a. The United States’ Geo-Strategic Interest on the Korean 
Peninsula 
Indeed, the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula was controversial 
before the Korean War. Korea “never loomed particularly large in the political or 
strategic calculations”47 for U.S. strategists because the onetime Hermit Kingdom was a 
small, poor, and backward country that had little or no economic, strategic, or political 
importance. Korea was little more than a pawn on the chessboard in those years, whereas 
strategists primarily focused on the security of Europe. The second expectation of the 
Soviets was that they would not engage in obvious aggression because it would result in a 
total war with the United States.48 Also, U.S. strategists believed the further expansion of 
the Soviet Union could be neutralized by the superior American air and sea power; thus, 
generally Korea’s importance would not be raised until the emergence of new variables. 
Based on such strategic calculation, U.S. strategists withdrew troops from South Korea 
and excluded Korea from the strategic Asian Defense Perimeter outlined by Secretary of 
State Acheson.  
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However, the two factors raised the strategic importance of the Korean 
Peninsula. First of all, after losing China to the hands of communists, Japan increasingly 
appeared as the critical counterbalance to the Soviet Union and China in the region. In 
order to prevent the communist camp’s further expansion and protect Japan—the U.S.’s 
the main ally in the region, South Korea became the front line and buffer zone.49 Also, 
the North Korean attack on the South was the testing board that examines the 
commitments of the United States toward the Soviet Union and the other allies. Even 
though the Truman administration was concerned that intervention in Korea would 
escalate to a general war, their main concern was that communist aggression, if left 
unchecked, would trigger a chain reaction, inducing further communist aggression 
elsewhere.50 This demonstrates that the Korean Peninsula’s strategic value is determined 
by the external powers’ relations and strategic environment.  
Since the Korean War, the U.S. foreign policy toward East Asia has been 
based on keeping America’s position as a preponderant status quo power in the region. 51 
The U.S. has wanted to maintain continuity rather than change, and its security and 
economic strategies toward the region reflected this reality.52 To the U.S., South Korea 
was a critical forward base in Northeast Asia for containing the Soviet Union and China 
during the Cold War. Also, its presence offers an important base as a foothold from 
which to promote, expand and maintain the U.S.’s preponderance and its influence over 
the region. In this context, the presence of U.S. troops on the peninsula is regarded as 
“one of the linchpins in Washington’s power structure design for the region.”53 Thus, 
what is emphasized is a firm American commitment to the maintenance of peace and 
stability on the peninsula and the regional status quo to secure its influence. In this regard, 
the interests of the United States on the Korean Peninsula are threefold: prevention of 
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armed unification by North Korea, an economically and politically stable South Korea, 
and the protection of Japanese security.  
b. China’s Geo-Strategic Interest on the Korean Peninsula  
The PRC also has an inherent geo-strategic interest in Korea because of its 
long common border with Korea. “Although never publicly articulated, China tends to 
view the Korean Peninsula as its natural sphere of influence.”54 Also, historically, China 
has deeply intervened and interacted in the every aspect of Korean society. Thus, China’s 
influence is inherently stronger than other countries. However, the most significant of 
China’s interests lay on the peninsula derived from the part of the strategic competition 
with other strong powers. Since the end of the nineteenth century, as competition among 
strong powers became fiercer, the Korean Peninsula emerged as a significant buffer zone.  
During the Cold War, China and the Soviet Union considered the 
geological location of the Korean Peninsula as “Finland, Poland, and Rumania in Europe, 
a springboard” in East Asia for the attack from Japan and the United States.55 Thus, 
Beijing has always considered Korea to be the “lips to China's teeth,” and it became the 
main justification of the “War to Resist America and Assist Korea” during the Korean 
War in order to prevent the presence of U.S. forces on China’s doorstep.56 After the war, 
the strategic value of Korean Peninsula remained as a safeguard against U.S. forces 
stationed in South Korea. Furthermore, this main strategic importance makes China to 
continuously support Pyongyang’s regime to survive.57 
In addition to that, the Korean Peninsula is a pawn to balance and check 
against the United States and Soviet Union for China. First of all, North Korea is an 
                                                 
54 David Shambaugh, “China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term,” The Washington 
Quarterly 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003), 50. 
55 Chang-il Ohn, “The Causes of the Korean War, 1950-1953,” International Journal of Korean 
Studies XIV, no. 2 (Fall 2010), 24.; John J. Tkacik, Jr., “How the PLA Sees North Korea,” Andrew Scobell 
and Larry M. Wortzel, eds., Shaping China’s Security Environment: The Role of the People’s Liberation 
Army (SSI: Carlisle, 2006), 149. 
56 Angus Ward, “The Mukden Affair,” American Foreign Service Journal, (February 1950), 15. 
57 Denny Roy, “China and the Korean Peninsula: Beijing’s Pyongyang Problem and Seoul Hope,” 
Asia-Pacific Security Studies 3, no. 1 (January 2004), 1–4. 
 27
important leverage against the United States over Taiwan issues. Because of its existence 
on the buffer zone, North Korea allows China to focus military presence along the 
Taiwan Straits instead of on the border with Korea. Additionally, U.S. forces in Japan 
and the South Korea are forced to divide their attention between the Korean Peninsula 
and Taiwan, instead of focusing purely on Taiwan issues.58 Also, China exploited North 
Korea as a pawn to check against the Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet conflict. 
While pursuing national interests and contesting preponderance in the 
region, those geo-strategic values of the Korean Peninsula for the U.S. and PRC produce 
structural pressure and influence regulating the behavior and strategic choices of South 
and North. However, it does not necessarily mean this structure and the influences of 
superpowers were the only determinants contributing to the continuation of the division. 
They could not directly intervene in both Koreas’ internal affairs and impose the will to 
both Koreas to choose policies to meet their interests. Rather, they took the advantages of 
the distinctive relations and desires for security of South and North Korea.  
2. The U.S.-China Rivalry and the Korean Peninsula 
The contemporary Northeast Asian security environment is dominated by the 
power dynamics of the two strongest countries, China’s political, economic ascendance 
and the U.S.’s relative decline. Thus, the geostrategic future of Northeast Asia largely 
depends on the choices and preferences of the two powers. 59  This great, changing 
dynamic in Northeast Asia has precipitated extensive and diverse discussions on whether 
China presents a threat to the U.S. and its other allies in the region. Scholars have been 
divided into optimist and pessimist to answer the question. Optimists argue that China’s 
economic growth depends on the Western-centered system, continued open and 
interdependent international economic relations, so that China should peacefully rise; 
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also other states use China’s rise as an opportunity for their economy. 60 On the other 
hand, Realpolitik pessimists see China’s rise and conflict as inherently so because a 
wealthy, strong China would not remain a status quo power, but an aggressive state 
determined to dominate Asia. Also, the United States will not tolerate the loss of its 
hegemony in the region. 61  
Thus, it is difficult to determine the future direction of U.S.-China 
relations. Indeed, neither of these arguments has been proven yet because close 
cooperation and severe conflict are still absent in the relations between two super 
powers.62 Practically, policymakers in those countries appear unwilling to give up either 
of the approaches, the economic engagement and realist-style balancing, due to the 
uncertainties about future directions. Thus, even though neither country is openly talking 
about hedging strategy, mutual hedging is becoming a core and perhaps even defining 
dynamic between the U.S. and China in Northeast Asia. Especially, the uncertainties—
derived from opaque intention, “implicitly competitive strategies, and potentially 
coercive policies of the other side”—drive both states to continuously adopt balancing 
strategy in order to check their counterpart’s influence and impure intentions while 
seeking economic cooperation.63  
In this balance of power context and according to power-transition theory, 
one can simply assume that if one power falters, its counterpart will be dominant. Thus, 
when Beijing seeks to expand its influence in its key arena, it will meet with determined 
resistance from Washington. Also, unless one power gains significantly superior strength 
over the other or is willing to concede its preponderance in the region, East Asia would 
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likely be split along geographic and ideological lines with continental and maritime 
spheres of influence due to competition between both powers.64 The problem for the 
inter-Korean relations is that the Korean Peninsula is geologically located right in the 
middle of the collision of both superpowers’ realistic interests. Also, the South and North 
are respectively involved as a member of continental and maritime spheres of influence. 
Therefore, when there is a continuing and perhaps mounting measure of tension and 
rivalry between the U.S. and China, the inter-Korean relations will be separated by 
Washington and Beijing’s efforts to weaken and neutralize each other’s nascent coalition 
and bind its friends into a more tightly integrated coalition.65 In other words, how these 
two countries define their relations and seek respective national interests tremendously 
influences the inter-Korean relations.  
3. The Preferred Status of the Korean Peninsula 
a. Preferences of the U.S. on the Inter-Korean Relations 
Henry Kissinger asserts “a change in the international environment so 
likely to undermine the national security… must be resisted no matter what form the 
threat takes or how ostensibly legitimate it appears.”66 For the reason, the U.S. has two 
premises for the inter-Korean relations: absence of severe conflict and continuity of 
preponderance. First of all, the U.S. takes for granted the peace and stability in the region, 
where it has key trading partners and allies, as its vital interest for the economic 
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Table 4.   The U.S. Trade with Asia and Europe (Figures for 1997 and 2007)67 
In this perspective, the U.S. postulates following the second premise as part of vital 
national security interests: 
(1) Regional stability and the absence of any dominant power or group of 
powers that would threaten or impede U.S. access or interests 
(2) Regional prosperity and the promotion of free trade and market 
access68 
Thus, within the broad context of the U.S. security strategy for the East, 
deterring and preventing any possible risk elements destabilizing the region and 
threatening allies are crucial. In the current regional security environment, the problems 
of Pyongyang, the nuclear weapons program, hostile military readiness and failed 
economy become the most precarious and uncertain factors for the U.S. Especially, a war 
initiated by North Korea is the worst-case scenario. Although the U.S.-ROK alliance 
would overwhelm the battlefield, due to the large size of the North Korean conventional 
military and possibly a nuclear weapon, the scale of casualties and the associated 
economic, humanitarian crisis would be disastrous for all involved. Furthermore, the 
scale of war would not limit the level of the peninsula because of complicated security 
connections and alliance pacts with other regional states. Thus, for the U.S., maintaining 
a strong defense commitment to the ROK in order to deter aggression, and dismantling 
North Korea's nuclear program not to threaten its allies, are regarded as its obligation. In 
a broad sense, in the longer term, the U.S. recognizes a unified Korea as a solution that 
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effectively integrates the North and South, and thereby promotes solid stability by 
removing the risks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the possibility of war.  
On the other hand, according to the logic of the power-transition theory, 
“the U.S. will oppose any change in the status quo in Korea that suggests a decline in 
American international influence relative to a rising China.”69 One of the most prominent 
challenges to the U.S. in the Korean Peninsula is the precarious stickiness of the military 
commitment “in the wake of future political reconciliation in Korea.”70  For Washington, 
the best scenario of the inter-Korean reconciliation and reunification is to preserve the 
stable and democratic status quo on the peninsula; maintain a free market economy; 
forsake nuclear weapons programs; and to forge a permanent alignment to Washington. 
However, given the growing Chinese influence on the peninsula politically and 
economically since the end of the Cold War, the more the South conciliate with the North, 
“the stronger the Chinese position is likely to be while the relative U.S. strength in the 
region is likely to decline over time.”71 In this context, after the reunification, the absence 
of a security threat for the South would significantly undermine the justification to stay 
on the peninsula. Therefore, unless Washington proves that the U.S. is a better long-term 
alliance option, compared to China, the rosy option of maintaining the United States 
Forces Korea (USFK) permanently will be become more uncertain. In other words, 
promoting inter-Korean reconciliation would not be the short or mid-term interest for the 
U.S. as long as it will deteriorates its strategic status in the peninsula.  
b. China’s Preference on the Peninsula 
China also seems to prefer the status quo in the peninsula.72 In the post-
Cold War era, the main focus of China’s national objective is to sustain a high level of 
undistracted domestic economic growth, and it has successfully achieved the goal based 
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upon regional stability and free-trade system. Thus, in order to maintain the high growth 
rate until reaching its desired end state, Beijing should promote stability and prosperity in 
East Asia, keeping a favorable precondition of economic development. Therefore, China 
puts the amicable political and security relations with neighboring states, including South 
Korea, on high priority to reduce international concern over China’s growing power.73 
Also, China firmly opposes any conflict that could possibly drive the region into chaos 
and negatively affect China’s economy and national interests. For this reason, to some 
extent, China admits the necessity of the current U.S. forces in the region in terms of 
deterrence of the war and conflict between regional states.  
Within this context, Beijing has concerns over tensions between the 
Koreas, the North Korean nuclear weapons program, and the fragile Pyongyang regime 
due to its precarious characteristic destabilizing regional relations. Most importantly, an 
undesirable escalation in tensions and a sudden collapse of the North would possibly 
provide excuses to U.S.-ROK alliance to intervene in North Korean issues in which the 
PRC will not be able to avoid confrontation. Furthermore, in the extreme case, the PRC 
could be entrapped in a war waged by Pyongyang. Also, the instability and abrupt 
collapse of the North Korean regime would impose unwanted high prices, such as relief 
and recovery payments, a large numbers of North Korean refugees which would flowing 
in the China, or possible armed conflicts on the peninsula, forcing China to intervene.74 
For these reasons, the PRC puts the peace and stability of the peninsula on high priority, 
and supports the peaceful reconciliation process between the South and North as a 
fundamental solution to resolve the ongoing problem.  
However, the uncertainty of the reunified Korea forces China to be 
reluctant to support the inter-Korean reconciliation process. In the context of the 
competition with the U.S., the PRC has actively sought improved relations with South 
Korea in the hope of undermining U.S. influence and as a countermeasure to balance 
against the U.S.’s encirclement. Also, Sino-ROK relations have improved significantly 
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based on the explosively increased trading size. However, Beijing is not sure whether a 
South Korean-led successful engagement and reconciliation with the North will become a 
benefit or a boomerang that comes back to threaten its security. Firstly, Beijing doubts 
Seoul’s attitude that it is reluctant to lose its alliance relationship with the U.S. In this 
case, South Korea will not forsake the patron relations with the U.S.; for China, it means 
taking over the entire peninsula by South Korea would mean facing the direct U.S. 
military presence on its border.75  Also, without resolving the Taiwan issue, Beijing 
would believe that diminishing influence on the North decreases China’s leverage vis-à-
vis Taiwan. In other words, the loss of an important strategic buffer zone may result in 
nothing but an increased threat. Furthermore, China will intrinsically have issues with the 
emergence of the strong united Korea. The united Korea might turn its attention to 
unpleasant issues such as territory and historical problems.76 Therefore, China would be 
more content with the current status of a divided Korea ensuring a preoccupied and weak 
state on one of China’s borders. In this context, also, as long as Pyongyang does not 
severely undermine Beijing’s security interests, Beijing has “no compelling reason to 
push for Korea’s immediate political reintegration, even by peaceful means.”77 Beijing 
would not pressure North Korea too hard because of the fear of triggering a collapse or 
losing influence on the Kim Jung-Il regime.78 Also, they basically favor reform by the 
Kim government rather than regime change or collapse. In other words, China’s high 
strategic interests lay in maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula and regional 
status quo.   
4. Prisoner’s Dilemma: Strategic Priorities of the U.S. and PRC  
Inherently, the threat perception and mutual strategic understanding of the U.S. 
and PRC significantly influence the inter-Korean reconciliation process and the 
feasibility of reunification. As noted above, the most shared strategic interests between 
                                                 
75 Roy, “China and the Korean Peninsula,” 1–4. 
76 Ibid., 2. 




the U.S. and PRC in the Korean Peninsula are in preserving peace and stability that is one 
of the desirable outcomes and obvious possibilities enabling both states to reach the 
cooperation and coordination.  At least in three aspects, the U.S. and PRC agree with the 
“three no's of policy toward the Korean Peninsula: no nukes, no war, and no abrupt 
collapse of North Korea.”79 Without doubt, in the longer term, both superpowers agree 
with that a unified Korea will be far more stable than the antagonistically divided two 
Koreas.  
CHINA 
 C D 
C 
Peacefully Reunified Korea 
(Peace & Stability without WMD)
U: Loss of Forward Base & Influence
C: A pro-China reunified Korea 
U.S. 
D 
U: A pro-U.S. reunified Korea 
C: Loss of Buffer & Influence 
Status Quo and Divided Korea 
(Ongoing Tension and WMD Issues)
Table 5.   Prisoner’s Dilemma between the U.S. and China on the Korean Peninsula 
However, within the context of U.S.-PRC hegemonic competition in the post-
Cold war era, uncertainties and lingering doubts are dominating their relations, even 
though they have ongoing cooperation in various areas. The Korean Peninsula is regarded 
as a security asset for both states, related to a security dilemma of relative gains and 
losses. In other words, because of the security strategic values of the South and North, 
one’s efforts at increasing influence on the peninsula are strongly interpreted as 
decreasing the security of others. Thus, even though there are incentives to cooperate 
between them, the uncertainties and doubts make them reluctant to approach the issue of 
the inter-Korean reconciliation seriously. Those uncertainties, doubts, and differences of 
strategic preferences on the inter-Korean reconciliation push both superpowers into a 
typical Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which both players’ optimal strategies are defection. 
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Therefore, under the current environment, unless the reunification guarantees both 
power’s status and preponderance, their strategic behavior will contribute to the 
continuity of the division of Korea. 
As described previous section, there are several options to reach cooperation even 
in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game. Ideally, if the U.S. and China peacefully coexist with 
the mutual understanding or are enforced by a third player, the external pressure 
separating both Koreas would be significantly decreased. However, there are simply no 
available measures or an “enforcer” to draw cooperation in the current security 
environment. Despite the increasing regional economic interdependence and integration, 
no comprehensive multilateral security framework emerged for possibly regulating and 
supervising the relationship. Indeed, South Korea tried to adopt the concept of “balancer” 
in order to mediate strategic interests of both powers and encourage cooperation to some 
extent, but it revealed the limitations because of its lack of capability to deter two 
superpowers, and basically, the South cannot be an enforcer because it should depend on 
the U.S.-ROK alliance whenever it faces security threat. 80 
Furthermore, the “tit-for-tat” strategy for the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma game is 
not working in the U.S.-PRC rivalry for the inter-Korean issue. First of all, because the 
U.S. and PRC are the super powers which their strategic interests are over several regions, 
international institutions, and diverse security aspects, clashing between the two super 
powers generates the significant impact on diverse and extensive dimension. Thus, 
despite the reunification and reconciliation provides regional benefits to both rivalries, it 
is difficult to expect that both powers take greater risk for the inter-Korean reconciliation. 
Indeed, the reunification and reconciliation is not an imminent interest for the U.S. and 
PRC simply because the current status quo is not the worst scenario for both sides and 
provides significant certainty—at least absence of major warfare and their significant 
strategic status—rather than that in the reunified Korean Peninsula. Also, to some extent, 
they already enjoy peace and stability under the current system. Therefore, unless a 
significant threat is imposed to both sides, such as war or a nuclear threat, there is no 
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reason that both superpowers would risk their preponderance by disturbing the status quo. 
In this context, despite both rivalries play the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, the tit-
for-tat would not occur for the Korean Peninsula.  
In short, the two super powers’ efforts to realize their maximum security interest 
drive the inter-Korean relations on the peninsula into their respective advantageous 
position produce not only peace and stability but also the endurable status quo. The 
tendency to continue the status quo not only results from the endogenous factors’ 
influence, but also is derived from the inter-Korean dynamics. The four players share a 
short-term interest in stability and certainty on the Korean Peninsula, which the division 
provides. Unless these countries find interest in the long-term peace on the peninsula, the 
continuing competition between rivalries works as a centrifugal force separating South 
and North Korea. 
D. THE INTER-KOREAN RIVALRY AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS ON 
THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
War can only be prevented if you will fight and keep a strong stance. If a bully 
sees you preparing for a fight by running and working out, he will think 
differently. You must prepare for war in order to gain peace. 
 
- Chun Doo-hwan, former ROK president (1982–
87) 
 
When the agreements made in the inter-Korean summit are materialized one by 
one, the Korean Peninsula will be freed from the legacy of the Cold War and the 
yoke of division. 
- Roh Moo Hyun, former ROK president (2003–08) 
Theoretically, if South and North Korea agree with issues of reconciliation and 
reunification, they can reach a consensus, even under the severe external pressure. This is 
because the inter-Korea relations are intrinsically a matter for both sides. However, it will 
not happen simply because both Koreas’ relations have been in the dilemmatic situation 
since the inception of division. Owing to its geographical location and size, Korea has 
been a battleground that absorbed and reflected broader hegemonic struggles for more 
than a century. As a result of the struggles, Korea was conquered, colonized, liberated, 
 37
and divided. 81 While going through these historical upheavals, both Koreans fought a 
tragic war and killed each other in the battlefield. Even though the Korean War was a 
kind of proxy war representing the clash of the super powers in the context of the global 
Cold War confrontation, it also became an important source of animosity, making each 
other pursue a tight vigilance, viewing each other as adversaries that were threatening 
security. On the other hand, the Korean nation has lived on the same territory as a 
homogeneous nation, sharing the same lineage throughout most of its long history, thus 
“the desire for the national reunification of the Korean nation is stronger than in any other 
nation.”82 Therefore, Koreans have long held two contradicting views of the other side—
as an enemy to be destroyed and as a partner with which to cooperate and be reunified.83  
1.  The Dual Identity of the Inter-Korean Relations 
a. Relations as an Independent State 
This distinctive historical experience and “division structure” created 
ambivalent characteristics of identity in the inter-Korean relations, not only resulting in 
the physical geographic division but also political, economic, and social separation.84 
First of all, the identity of the inter-Korean relationship is basically based on an equal 
status as state vis-à-vis state. In the anarchical international system, in which the ultimate 
objective of states is the elimination of the security threat, both Koreas have 
incompatibility derived from ideological differences and animosity, and it drove both to 
prioritize their security policy of preventing or eliminating the counterpart’s threat in the 
name of reunification. 85  As the independent-state status, the most certain way to 
eliminate the threat is to conquer or make the other side subservient to the will by 
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building a superior economy and military. Otherwise, they should have a peace 
agreement or treaty signed as normal state relations in order to avoid conflict. Thereby, 
unless there is a security agreement in the relations, both Koreas will endlessly doubt 
each other and prepare for uncertainty with realistic measures. Within this context of the 
relations, seeking reunification means absorption and conquest, or facilitating the 
collapse of the other side.  
b. Relations as the Same Ethnic Nationality 
On the other end of spectrum, another approach toward inter-Korean 
relations is to regard the two Koreas as a part of one Korea. Therefore, the reunification is 
the inter-ethnic issue that should be resolved with only bilateral efforts without external 
influence. Fundamentally, this irredentism has been an ultimate idea and basis of both 
Koreas’ reunification policies. 86  From the perspective of the ethnic nationalist, the 
ultimate end-state of reunification is not the game of relative gain and relative loss for the 
South and North, but it is a constructive integration into the grand Korea. Thus, if both 
Koreas genuinely emphasize ethnic identity and work toward peaceful cooperation and 
coordination for the ultimate goal, the feasibility of the reunification is more plausible for 
the South and North, and they can avoid exhaustive and meaningless competition. Indeed, 
officially, both Koreas have approached each other under that premise. The consensus 
they have reached defined the inter-Korean relations as “Recognizing that their 
relationship, not being a relationship as between states, is a special one constituted 
temporarily in the process of unification.”87  This declaration was embedded in “the 
North-South Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972,” and reaffirmed in “the 1991 inter-
Korean Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation.” 
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Also, this principle was declared again in “the 15 June agreement of the historic inter-
Korean summit meeting in 2000.”88 
Since the inception of two separate regimes on the peninsula, these two 
different identities of the inter-Korean relations produced contradictory and dilemmatic 
relations. They often asserted the importance of the peaceful reunification, but it never 
helped to decrease the military readiness and capability of both sides. Rather, the slogan 
of peaceful reunification has been exploited as a reunification strategy on their own terms. 
Both Koreas simply cannot give up their ethnic identity and state sovereignty. Therefore, 
the two Koreas have engaged in a fierce competition to be recognized as the only 
legitimate state on the peninsula by eliminating the other side. Especially, the failure of 
reunification through the Korean War triggered a “legitimacy war,” in which they 
attempted to undercut each other in every possible way.89 
2. The Enduring Rivalry and Security Dilemma in the Inter-Korean 
Relations 
This contradictory relationship between the South and North drives them to have 
unique rivalry relations. According to Wooksung Kim, the inter-Korean relations can be 
categorized into “enduring rivalry.”90 Generally, the rivalry relationship between two 
countries has been understood as a phenomenon to resolve expected and repeated 
conflicts involving the threat or use of military force. In the enduring rivalry relationship, 
the arch-enemies’ conflict lasts longer than other rivalry relationships. Especially in the 
Korean case, the incompatibility, derived from different ideologies, core interests, the 
absence of imaginative leaders, and reinforcement and reciprocity often make very 
difficult to terminate the rivalry.  
Therefore, in this ongoing and enduring rivalry, the animosity and vicious war 
memory continuously reproduce suspicion and tension, driving both Koreas into 
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possessing more capabilities to overwhelm and deter the other side. On the other hand, in 
the zero-sum perspective, an opponent’s acquisition of additional capability is interpreted 
as a significant security threat and a reduced ability to defend. Therefore, both Koreas 
endlessly have sought a superior military capability or tried to offset the counterpart’s 
superiority with additional means, by devising strategy and tactics (e.g., surprise attack 
and asymmetric warfare), acquiring a superior weapons system, enhancing the 
willingness of waging a war, and allying with strong countries.  However, the improved 
military capability does not allow the superior state to enjoy enough security because it 
leads the other part of Korea to react with whatever means it takes to restore its military 
capability. In other words, making an adversary more insecure or increasing a state’s 
military capability often produces the net result that reduces the state’s security. 91 
Thereby, both countries’ security threat remains as unchanged. Therefore, in the balance 
of power game, neither Korea could achieve the superiority and mitigate counterpart’s 
security threat. Also, both rivalries have not allowed the other side to achieve a decisive 
victory or have an overwhelming advantage on another. In this situation, conflicts are 
sustained in the relations and spread into the South Korean domestic politics; also, the 
ambiguity of the superior national power makes negotiation more opaque and deadlocked. 
The enduring security dilemma has led to stalemate with little room for barter or 
bargaining. 
3. Balance of Power and Strategic Behavior of Both Koreas 
Even though the South and North “have been caught in a zero-sum, winner-take-
all, mutual hostage situation”92 for over fifty years, neither side could attempt to mount a 
major military operation nor achieve enough capability to challenge the balance of 
power. For one thing, at least, both possessed deterrent capabilities to protect itself from 
the other side. However, in the center of the security dilemma, both patrons’ potential and 
practical military capabilities deterred both Koreas from direct military action toward 
another side. Particularly, the U.S. deployment in South Korea has taken a central role for 
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the deterrence, making the chances of clashes of war on the Korean Peninsula remote. 
Although the North has built numerically larger armed forces with supports from the 
strong communist neighbors, the U.S.–ROK military forces are much more capable and 
highly trained than the North. Therefore, the ROK could attain deterrent capability 
without entailing a massive conventional buildup, which would otherwise sacrifice the 
economic development.93  
In this context, the South and North have shown different and similar balancing 
acts according to the various time periods when the relative superiority, military 
capability, and alliance relationships are significantly differentiated between them. 
 
Figure 5.  Per Capita GNP of North and South Korea, 1953–199094 
The economic and military comparisons of the South and North show that North 
Korea had a relatively equal level of military spending and economy scale, but quickly 
began falling behind after the mid-1970s. Thus, if North Korea might have hoped to win 
the war against the South, it should have been no later than the mid-1970s, when the U.S. 
lessened the military commitment in the region and also when the South was only 
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beginning its economic surge.95 On the other hand, this balance of power greatly reversed 
when the South reached much higher economic development than the North since the 
1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In these two similar but reversed periods, 
both the South and North showed analogous patterns of behaviors offsetting the 
counterpart’s advantageous position, enhancing power to protect itself, and trying to 
subvert the other side. 
 
Figure 6.  Defense Spending, 1967–199796 
a. The North’s Superior Balance of Power During the Cold War in 
1970s 
During the late-1960s and mid-1970s, the most dramatic change in the 
strategic environment in East Asia was Washington’s policy to scale back defense 
commitments abroad despite the absence of any corresponding decrease in threats to the 
region. The Nixon administration sought to reduce the number of troops stationed in 
South Korea in the broader context of détente and withdrawal from Vietnam. Nixon's 
Guam doctrine of July 1969 clearly stated that the U.S. would no longer bear the primary 
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defense burden of its Asian allies. Implementation of the policy took the form of a 
general drawdown of forces in the Korean Peninsula, from 630,000 in January 1969 to 
43,000 by December 1971.97 In July 1970, the U.S. withdrew the 7th Infantry Division 
from the peninsula. This was the largest reduction of forces since the Korean War; 
moreover, the responsibility for defense along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) transferred 
to the ROK. 
Country January 1969 December 1971 Authorized Reductions 
Vietnam 549,500 159,000 390,500 
Korea 63,000 43,000 20,000 
Thailand 47,800 32,000 15,800 
Japan 39,000 32,000 7,000 
Philippines 28,000 18,000 9,100 
Table 6.   U.S. Military Personnel Reductions, 1969–197198 
From Seoul's perspective, the Nixon doctrine of U.S. withdrawal from 
1969–1971 was accompanied by U.S. appeasement with adversaries in the region from 
1972–74. Especially, the appeasement approach took place while a series of DPRK 
provocations heightened early in the period. (i.e., the DPRK commando raid on the ROK 
presidential Blue House in 1968, seizure of the USS Intelligence ship Pueblo in 1971, and 
the shooting down of a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane)99 Such U.S. policy changes 
raised acute fears of U.S. abandonment in Seoul, regardless of Nixon’s promise of 
reassurances. An ROK official recalled that “American passivity after the Blue House 
raid evoked true feelings of indignation and disappointment” over the U.S 
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indifference.100 Also, President Park stated that Nixon's attitude sent a clear message “to 
the Korean people that [the U.S.] won't rescue [us] if North Korea invades again.”101 
Also, although the Nixon administration encouraged the South to take part 
in the détente mood also on the peninsula, and Park signed a joint communiqué with 
North Korea on 4 July 1972, along with countless meetings on devising confidence-
building measures, it could not help him to remove ample wariness about future 
security. 102  Even though the North positively responded to South’s request for the 
dialogue, the North’s attitude toward the inter-Korean reconciliation was still uncertain 
and dubious. For President Park, “the détente was “illusory,” cautioning against belief in 
the “spurious peace offensives” of North Korea and China, and persistently sought U.S. 
guarantees against further troop reductions.”103 Later, it is believed that Kim Il-Sung 
considered the inter-Korean dialogue as a useful method to undermine Park Chung-hee’s 
dictatorship and eliminate the U.S. forces from the peninsula, rather than a way to 
achieve genuine cooperation between the northern and southern regimes.104 President 
Park also regarded the dialogue as a tool to gain time to build military capability and 
institutional unity while forestalling “reckless acts by Kim Il Sung” and reducing 
“chances of war.”105 As a result of that, a joint communiqué finished without meaningful 
agreement, and dialogue was eventually cut off. 
In fact, for the ROK, threats from the North were not increased, but its 
capability was decreased with the patron’s reduced commitment. Along with the initial 
reduction of U.S. forces on the peninsula, and watching helplessly the fall of Saigon in 
1975, the abandonment fear triggered South Korea to autonomously seek to elevate South 
Korea’s indigenous economic, technological, and military capabilities, including the 
pursuit of a covert nuclear weapons program during the 1970s. Park levied a new defense 
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tax on the country,106 and “the size of the defense budget rose 51.2 percent, from $461 
million in 1973 to $697 million in 1974. The annual rate of increase in defense spending 
reached 59 percent in 1976.”107 Even the desperate diplomatic effort for the U.S. support 
led to the “Koreagate scandal.” “Anxieties over U.S. abandonment were especially 
reflected in the repressive 'Yusin’ (“revitalizing”) constitution, effectively putting the 
nation on a wartime footing, in October 1972, as well as the clandestine program to 
develop a South Korean nuclear deterrent.”108 Park rationalized these measures as coping 
with overcoming dependence on an uncertain U.S. commitment in the long term and 
achieving strategic superiority over North Korea.109 
b. Reversed Balance of Power Since the Post-Cold War Era 
Interestingly enough, North Korea has shown similar pattern of behavior 
when it lost compatibility with the South. Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea 
faced significant changes in its lowered international status and relatively reduced 
military capability compared to South Korea. The inefficiency of the centrally planned 
economy and high military spending, along with drought and floods, drove the North 
Korean economy into a crisis.110 Furthermore, from the events of the demise of socialism, 
along with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the normalization of the relationship 
between the South and North's traditional allies, Russia and China, South Korea’s 
superiority appeared to be inevitable. The South’s ambitious political created more fear in 
the North. On the eve of his historic trip to Beijing in 1992 to celebrate Seoul-Beijing 
diplomatic ties, Roh Tae Woo declared “the main goal of my ‘northern policy’ was to 
open formal relations with North Korea’s friends and allies, and through them to 
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influence North Korea itself.” 111  Furthermore, the South ambitiously launched the 
“Sunshine Policy” during the two progressive governments based on the economic 
superiority in the name of reconciliation, economic cooperation and nationalistic identity. 
In this atmosphere, even though North Korea’s collapse seemed not to be followed 
sooner, the South’s superiority was obvious over the peninsula. 
The Kim Jong-Il regime perceived the changes of balance of power as a 
grave danger to its security and survival, and the new changes of the security 
environment on the Korean Peninsula induced fear and a sense of crisis. Besides, since 
the 1990s, North Korea experienced the severely deteriorated economic situation and 
famine. However, the central dilemma the regime faced is that if Pyongyang fundamental 
undertakes economic reforms to solve internal problem, it will eventually disintegrate the 
national unity sustained by a highly controlled system, closing all doors from the outside 
world. In this situation, reforming the economic system and opening the market would 
mean the loss of control over its people and step closer to collapse. Moreover, the highly 
militarized North Korean economy, as seen in the ratio of military personnel accounting 
for 9 percent of total work force, and military spending accounting for 23 percent of GDP, 
further worsened the economic problems. However, Pyongyang simply cannot reduce its 
conventional forces under the inferior status compared to the South. 
With the economic problem and insufficient resources, the North should 
compensate the disparity of military capability with the South. Pyongyang chose to 
develop the asymmetry and unconventional of military capability compared to the South 
while sustaining a large conventional military to withstand pressure from external and 
internal pressures. Most importantly, Pyongyang has attempted to acquire nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles in a way to offset the imbalance with the South. When 
Moscow informed Pyongyang of its decision to establish diplomatic ties with Seoul, then 
foreign Minister Kim Young Nam warned that North Korea had no choice but to 
facilitate the development of necessary weapons, indicating a possible development of 
nuclear weapons. The main purposes for developing such strategic-level weapons are 
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threefold: (1) to offset North Korea’s own vulnerabilities in the face of robust ROK–U.S. 
deterrence and defense capabilities, (2) as a bargaining chip to secure political, security, 
and economic incentives from South Korea and the U.S. and  (3) to earn much-needed 
foreign currency through missile exports. Even though the nuclear weapons program 
deteriorated relations with the U.S., it made the rivalry persistent by providing the North 
with relative power parity.112 
On the other hand, motivational asymmetry can compensate for the 
inferiority of a weaker state in power capabilities when the state has stronger 
motivational power, which is closely related to the stakes in a dispute.113 In order to 
consolidate the regime’s unity and enhance the “defensive power” to resist influences 
from other states, 114  the North attempted to tighten ideological armament (Juche), 
exercise “military first policy” (Songun), and adopt asymmetric military strategy and 
tactics.115 This motivational power of North Korea greatly enhances its resistance and 
exercise of defensive power.  
4. Prisoner’s Dilemma of Inter-Korean Rivalry in the Post-Cold War 
Era 
Based upon the current balance of power between two Koreas and their enduring 
rivalry experience, because of the ROK-DPRK rivalry’s distinctive feature—dual 
identities, they play different types of games from the U.S.-PRC rivalry. Generally, with 
respect to the emphasis on one of either identity, there are three numbers of possible 
games: chicken-game, boxed-pig game, and prisoner’s dilemma. First of all, as the two 
Koreas have maintained during the Cold War, if both choose independent state identity 
rather than ethnic identity, the feature of dynamics will be a zero-sum game which would 
never allow any cooperation. The second case is that one Korea emphasizes more on 
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ethnic identity whereas the other chooses state identity. In this case, the two Koreas play 
boxed-pig game, in which one party has more temptation to defect whereas the other has 
more motivation for cooperation. The final case is the prisoners’ dilemma game when 
both sides choose the ethnic identity (the positive basement for reconciliation). One 
notable fact is that any of these games will not produce cooperation between South and 
North Korea. 
First, if both have independent ethnic identity, the inter-Korean rivalry is more 
straightforward in terms of the security dilemma. The distinctive rivalry—seeking sole 
legitimacy on the peninsula—induces the profound incompatibility between the South 
and North, and it pushes the inter-Korean relations more close to the zero-sum game, in 
which one side’s relative gains are directly linked to the counterpart’s relative loss. In this 
game, as a result of optimum cooperation, the reunification would be strongly interpreted 
as the demise and compromise of the sovereignty and regime for a weaker side. Thus, 
there are robust uncertainties and distrust for reconciliation and the cooperation process. 
Also, it pushes both Koreas never to give up security assets, including autonomous effort 
and foreign support, to deter from the other side.  
 
 
Table 7.   Matrix for Boxed-Pig Game 
Second, if two Koreas seek different identity from each other, it will be also very 
difficult to have cooperation because the one which emphasizes the state identity will 
always defect or suck counterpart’s cooperation. On the other hand, if one Korea that 
chooses ethnic identity possesses dominant position over the other, it makes the boxed-
pig game in which the defection is rational choice for the small pig because in any mutual 
cooperation, the big pig would take biggest share of benefits from the game; the defection 
Small Pig 
 C D 
C 5, 1 4, 4 
Big Pig 
D 9, -1 0, 0 
 49
retains more benefits.116 This game well explains the relations between the Kim and Roh 
progressive governments (ethnic identity, big pig) and Kim Jong-Il regime (state identity, 
small pig). According to the game, for South Korea, the cooperation has greater incentive 
than the defection. The more the cooperation occurs, the more South Korea has the 
advantageous position to lead inter-Korean relations and reunification with its greater 
scale of economy. On the other hand, North Korea has more incentive for the defection. 
In order to protect the regime, nuclear weapons program is an essential security asset, and 
economic support is indispensable for Pyongyang. In this respect, defection is always a 
rational choice for the Pyongyang because it enables Pyongyang to gain significant 
economic benefits from Seoul’s Sunshine policy while continuing to develop the nuclear 
program. 
DPRK 
 C D 
C 
Peaceful Coexistence or 
Peacefully Reunified Korea 
(Peace & Stability without WMD)
S: Suckered by the DPRK 
N: Gain time to develop WMD 
ROK 
D 
S: Leading Unification Process 
N: Absorbed by the ROK 
Status Quo and Divided Korea 
(Ongoing Tension and WMD Issues)
Table 8.   Prisoner’s Dilemma or Boxed-Pig Game between two Koreas 
Finally, when both Koreas emphasize more on ethnic identity than state identity, 
they will share the same ultimate goal—reunification. As the best condition for 
reconciliation, the two Koreas’ ethnic identity will help to achieve optimal outcomes 
when both choose cooperation. For the North, the cooperation means abandoning nuclear 
arms and armed provocation and, for the South, providing economic, humanitarian aid 
and helping North Korean economic reform without attempts to overthrow Kim Jong-Il 
regime. While having cooperation and acknowledging the counterpart, the two Koreas 
can peacefully coexist with each other and eventually solve the nuclear weapons and 
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conventional armed conflict while relieving counterpart’s concern for the security. 
However, even in this case, the prisoner’s dilemma works between the two Koreas, 
wherein neither side can choose cooperation.  
For more than fifty years, both Koreas have kept vigilance, animosity, different 
political system, and culture; therefore, they should have lingering doubts and deep 
distrust about counterpart’s intention. Literally, they have anything measures which can 
clarify counterpart’s true intention in the current inter-Korean relations. Because of that, 
the both Koreas would act similarly to the zero-sum game. Therefore, both Koreas should 
assume that the counterpart still retains hostile intentions and would defect for its 
cooperation when they choose security decision. These lingering doubts make them more 
hesitated toward dialogue and cooperation while persistently keeping large scale of 
military and maintaining tightened alliance. Therefore, both sides take a defection 
strategy in which their payoffs are smaller than mutual cooperation (R) but still higher 
than the counterpart (S).  
Similar to the U.S.-PRC relations, the ROK-DPRK has any plausible measures to 
promote cooperation and punish defection to solve the prisoner’s dilemma problem. Also, 
despite indefinitely and closely interacting relations, the “tit-for-tat” strategy seems not to 
have any effectiveness for their dilemma. One of the most important reasons is that both 
Koreas have a great power as their respective patron, thus its limited retaliatory 
movement would be undercut by the countermovement of opposition’s alliance. For 
example, the South’s economic support could easily be mitigated by substituting Chinese 
support. Also, based on two sets of alliance relations, the tit-for-tat strategy would inflict 
security dilemma and vicious chain reactions. Indeed, both Koreas take the tit-for-tat 
strategy from time to time (i.e. North Korean threat to use nuclear weapons, the U.S.-
ROK military demonstration). However, these only further deteriorated animosity and 
strained the bilateral relations. Furthermore, the tit-for-tat strategy is not so effective 
because the North simply does not possess much to lose, thus it can endure even the 
severe sanction imposed by the U.S. and ROK. In contrast, the ROK has much to lose for 
the tit-for-tat strategy, thus it is reluctant to use it.  
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Therefore, even if retaliatory movement would be theoretically an effective strategy for 
the prisoner’s dilemma, it does not provide the motivation to cooperate and restrain 
defection in the inter-Korean relations. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter compares and contrasts the priorities of national interests of the U.S., 
China, and both Koreas with respect to the rivalries on the peninsula in order to illustrate 
the difficulty to modify the status quo. There would be controversies to define the 
national interest and priority of states related to the peninsula because of endlessly 
changing dynamics in relations, broader security concerns, and contingent issues. 
However, despite these difficulties, two important features are certainly identified in the 
two sets of rivalries. Firstly, with lingering doubts, suspicions, and uncertainties in their 
security relations, the four players exercise vigilance against its rivalry, and deeply 
intertwined rivalry relations prevent all players from stepping forward to the cooperation. 
However, even in the strained rivalries, in many cases, there exists common ground in 
which the rivalries share interests and can gain better result when they cooperate for it. 
Therefore, the possibility for the cooperation is still open for them.  
One of the obviously shared interests for all the four players is the “maintaining 
peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula.” For over fifty years, this strongly shared 
interest has worked as a stabilizing force restraining major conflicts within the peninsula. 
However, the same factors contributing to the stability also work as preventing the status 
quo from changing. Even though conciliated inter-Korean relations will provide greater 
benefits to all the players in a longer term—in terms of the fundamental solution for the 
North Korean nuclear weapons program, possibility of major armed conflict between the 
two Koreas, North Korean provocations disturbing regional stability, and economic 
trouble of the North, the four players seem not to choose cooperation easily because these 
four players’ lingering doubts drive them into the delicate prisoner’s dilemma, in which 
two rational rivalries always have an unintended suboptimal result by choosing defection. 
Within the deadlock relations between the two sets of rivalries, the inter-Korean 
reconciliation would not likely happen unless these deeply interconnected rivalry’s 
relations are dismantled.  
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III. ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA AND INTER-KOREAN 
RELATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter analyzed how rivaling relations, between the U.S.–PRC 
and the ROK–DPRK, determine four players’ attitudes toward the inter-Korean 
reconciliation. In this chapter, this paper attempts to examine the other important 
relational links of causal forces, “two alliance coalitions,” between the U.S. and the ROK 
and between the PRC and the DPRK. As George Liska noted, “it is impossible to speak 
of international relations without referring to alliances.”117 The alliance system has taken 
on greater importance in defining international relations in Northeast Asia and inter-
Korean relations. Undoubtedly, an alliance works as an important security mechanism for 
each of the four players to counterbalance each other’s threat, but also the alliance 
linkage often works as a restriction on the freedom of action for security decision making 
and policy execution when allies are protecting different interests. In other words, 
inconsistent attitudes and policy priorities between alliance members produce obstacles 
for the inter-Korean reconciliation.  
Indeed the U.S.–ROK and the PRC–DPRK alliances have sounded divergent 
voices within the relations since the formation of alliances. Also, as significant security 
environmental changes in the post-Cold war period, the divergence on threat perception 
and interest is inevitable for all four players. In this respect, this chapter focuses on how 
different stances or interests between allies influence the inter-Korean reconciliation. In 
order to understand when and how allies have different priorities and interests, this 
chapter briefly introduces the determinants of alliance cohesion and discordance by 
exploring existing alliance theories and alliance security dilemma theory. It then 
investigates two sets of alliances and different attitudes between allies in order to verify 
the influence on the inter-Korean relations.  
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B. ALLIANCE AND SECURITY DILEMMA THEORY 
1. The Determinants of the Cohesion of the Alliance 
Alliance can be defined as “… formal associations of states for use (or non-use) 
of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, 
against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified.”118 As 
such, allies join forces in order to enhance their security protection. Also, the credibility 
of commitment—projecting the integrated power on the common interest—is the 
important criterion determining the effectiveness, existence, and capability of the alliance. 
There are three major factors influencing and determining the coherence of alliance in a 
realist perspective: balance of power, threat perception, and self-interest.  
From the perspective of the balance of power theorists, the “balance means actual 
or constructed (through alliances) equality of military capability among the great powers” 
in order to prevent “one state or coalition from achieving dominance.”119 Kenneth Waltz 
defines balancing as “joining with the weaker side in an effort to prevent a hegemonic 
bid.”120 From this logic of the balance of power, the formation of alliances is often based 
on the “function of preserving the status quo” 121  and cooperating against common 
enemies.122 Thus, when the imbalance of power between rivalries is great, the motivation 
to form and maintain alliances will be great. In other words, the more the opposing power 
weakens, the more the temptation of dissension and withdrawal from the alliance 
grows.123  
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In addition, the other pillar of the alliances’ coherence is the state’s threat 
perception.124  An alliance is not probable without an adversary, because alliances are 
“against, and only derivatively for, someone or something.” 125  Walt argues an 
“imbalance of threat,” derived from the other side’s “aggregate power, geographic 
proximity, offensive capability, and the perceived aggressiveness of its intentions,” drives 
states to form an alliance.126 Thus, balancing is “allying with others against the prevailing 
threat.”127 From the threat-based perspective, “[t]he greater threat the state posed by an 
adversary, the greater cohesion of the alliance”128 rises. In other words, when the threat 
perception decreases, the justification of alliance also decreases. 
Third, the important determinant of forming alliances is the common interest.129 
From the interest-based theorist perspective, most states would rather pursue an alliance 
as a “means to profit”130 and achieve particular security or non-security goals effectively. 
Thus, alliance cohesion depends on the calculation of the benefits and costs of shared 
common interests among partners. In this respect, the benefits of alliance, such as 
“deterrence of attack, defense capability against attack, preclusion of alliance or 
alignment between the partner and the opponent, and increased control or influence over 
the allied state,”131 are greater than the costs, such as providing aid, facing the danger of 
entrapment and a counter-alliance, and sacrificing alternative alliance options and 
freedom of action due to the coordination with allies for specific policies.132 Thus, the 
more the benefits the more the desire to form and maintain the alliance. Also, when the 
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common interests diminish, allies may renegotiate an alliance treaty and its 
characteristics, trying to find interests within it unless they do not want to abolish it.133 
2. The Alliance Security Dilemma 
According to Snyder, once an alliance has been formed, policymakers concern 
themselves more with alliance management than alliance formation, because alliances are 
never absolutely firm. Thus, they should decide how much commitment they will make 
toward their strategic partner. However, this assignment poses a dilemma for 
policymakers because either too much or too little commitment generates equally 
undesirable side effects, the so-called alliance security dilemma.134 The key features of 
the alliance security dilemma are the fears of abandonment and entrapment with the 
formation of an alliance. Abandonment and entrapment reflect the combination of values 
and risks inherent in any alliance arrangement.135 Abandonment refers to defection in the 
form of realignment with the opponent, mere de-alignment, abrogation, or failure to make 
an explicit commitment when the other allies most need it. On the other hand, entrapment 
refers to “being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interest that one does not share.” 136  
Thus, the calculation for the risks and values of the preservation of the alliance 
would be the maximization of the states’ security interest from the alliance while 
minimizing their obligations to it. 137  If risk exceeds value for the alliance, fear of 
entrapment emerges.  Also, if value exceeds risk for the alliance, over that of partner’s, a 
state is concerned more about abandonment of a partner. Also, the efforts to reduce the 
fear of abandonment and entrapment often work inversely towards each other. When a 
state strengthens its commitment toward an ally and stands firm against an ally’s 
adversary, the partner’s risk of abandonment decreases while the state’s risk of 
entrapment increases. In contrast, when a state withholds commitment or seeks to 
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conciliate with the ally’s enemy, its fear of entrapment reduces, whereas the partner’s risk 
of abandonment increases.  
More specifically, Snyder introduced the determinants for fears of the 
abandonment and entrapment in the alliance security dilemma (as shown in Table 9). 
These factors are the principal determinants of the values and the likelihood that parties 
in an alliance impute to the various possible consequences of strategy options. These 
values and likelihoods are the proximate determinants of strategy choice itself.138  
Asymmetry of Determinants  Increase Decrease 
Direct Dependence on the Partner 
(Military capability, assistance, etc.) Abandonment  Entrapment 
Indirect Dependence on the Partner 
(Strategic, geographical interest, etc.)  Abandonment Entrapment 
Explicitness of Commitment Entrapment Abandonment 
Disparity from Partner’s Interest Entrapment Abandonment 
Frequent Miss Behavioral Record of Partner Abandonment Entrapment 
Table 9.   Correlation between Principal Determinants and the Fear of Abandonment and 
Entrapment139 
Thus, the more or less a state has characteristics of these determinants, the more 
or less “likely it is that the costs and risks of abandonment will outweigh the costs and 
risks of entrapment.”140 As Snyder briefly summarized: 
If a state feels highly dependent on its ally, directly or indirectly, if it 
perceives the ally as less dependent, if the alliance commitment is vague, 
and if the ally’s recent behavior suggests doubtful loyalty, the state will 
fear abandonment more than entrapment. It will therefore tend to reassure 
the ally of its commitment, support him in specific confrontations with 
opponent, and conciliating the opponent. The reverse conditions will tend 
to induce opposite strategies. 141 
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3. The Implication of Alliance Theories for the Inter-Korean 
Reconciliation 
To summarize those alliance theories, the primary driving forces in alliance 
formation are the intensity and convergence of a threat perception and common interest 
between allies. As noted above, the higher level of threat for a state positively correlates 
with seeking the greater level of alliance cohesion. Also, the more the allies share such 
threat perception and interest, the more the alliance will experience cooperation on 
related issues. On the other hand, if the alliance shares divergent or lower levels of 
interest and threat perception, the allies will have a weaker cohesive alliance or will soon 
be disintegrated. However, these do not provide an explanation regarding cases of 
disparity of interest and threat perception, which allies want the alliance, but their focus 
of the alliance on divergent interest and threat perception.  
Alliance’s Common Threat & Interest 
Correlation 
Converging Diverging 
 Alliance Cohesion Increase Decrease 
 Alliance Security Dilemma Decrease Increase 
Table 10.   Correlations between Threat Perception, Interest and Alliance 
The alliance security dilemma theory helps to explain the coherence of an alliance 
as well as the divergent strategy within an alliance. According to the theory, if allies 
share the identical threat perception with respect to the other state, then cooperation 
should ensue. Because both would have the abandonment fears with each other, they will 
show more commitment to the alliance.142 However, if allies have a disparity of interest 
and threat perception from a third state, then there will be intensified friction while 
executing different policies toward the state, because it produces fears of entrapment and 
abandonment in relations to asymmetry of costs and values.143 In this situation, the most 
dilemmatic situation is that often a partner’s rational option is a weaker commitment 
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toward an alliance. As noted, if a state has a higher fear of abandonment relative to the 
partner, then the state will show a stronger commitment to the alliance in order to get the 
partner’s reciprocity. However, the assured commitment raises the partner’s incentive to 
defect because the partner can preserve its interests regardless of its attitude; low 
commitment also reduces the risk of entrapping in a conflict with an unwanted 
objective.144 Thus, the state’s desired reciprocity and the partner’s reluctance produce 
divergent priorities and policies toward the third state, and dissatisfaction and friction 
between allies will follow while executing different strategies.145  
The most important focus of this chapter is the asymmetry of "interests" and 
"priorities" on the security issues between the two alliance coalitions, which makes 
different sets of abandonment and entrapment problems—ultimately impacting on the 
policies for the inter-Korean reconciliation. First of all, the disparity of interests between 
external and internal powers is mainly derived from different dimension and scale of 
interest focus. While the U.S. and China’s interest tends to emphasize global issues, or at 
least regional, that of the South and North is mainly limited to the Korean Peninsula. 
Commonly, a small state concentrates on a narrow range of vital interests, 146 whereas a 
big power has to take many considerations into account in choosing its course of action, 
including the impacts on other countries and regions. This different level of interests 
produces profound differences for policy approaches. Second, the end of the Cold War 
brought significant changes in relations between four players, and they should redefine 
threat with respect to the changed relations. Thus, the alliances have faced the asymmetry 
of fear of abandonment and entrapment with changed calculations of risks and values in 
security relations. In short, those two sets of the disparity of the abandonment and 
entrapment problems inevitably produced dissonance between allies while making and 
executing security policies. 
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C. THE ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE U.S. –ROK ALLIANCE 
1. Threat Perception Changes between the U.S. and ROK 
The alliance between the ROK and the U.S. has often been considered one of the 
most successful examples of security cooperation since the mutual defense treaty in 
October 1953.147 The bilateral alliance was frequently “deemed a friendship cemented in 
blood, marked by memories of shared sacrifice.”148 During the Cold War era, the primary 
purpose of the U.S.–ROK alliance was to deter the North Korean threat. Even though the 
U.S. and ROK had different levels of interests—preventing the spread of Communism in 
the region vs. preventing North Korean domination over the peninsula—the two 
countries’ best way to achieve their respective goals were consistent: the strong 
deterrence of North Korea. The alliance served as an effective security platform to deter 
North Korean aggression, and it enabled the ROK to create the stability and security for 
economic dynamism and democratic consolidation.149 However, the U.S.–ROK alliance 
has been an imbalanced relationship close to the absolute asymmetric alliance, to which 
the ROK’s desire for the deterrence was totally dependent on U.S. military capability. 
Thus, the abandonment fear was always much higher among the ROK strategists, 
whereas the U.S. was concerned more about entrapment in conflicts between two Koreas. 
Within such an asymmetric alliance, the degree of commitment and the policy tendencies 
of U.S. administrations have been considered as the biggest determinants for South 
Korean decision makers, and its influence on the security policies and domestic politics 
was absolute during the Cold War period. 
Over six decades, U.S.–ROK relations have changed from a patron–client 
relationship into a “normal” and “mature” interdependent partnership. 150  Substantial 
changes in the security environment in the post-Cold War era brought different 
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perspectives and different priorities toward the opposition actors in security policies, and 
it fostered diverging rationale in the alliance. The widening perception gap between 
Washington and Seoul concerning threats from North Korea and China, and policy 
divergence, have produced “tension, fissure, and mutual distrust” between the two 
allies.151  
a. The U.S. Interests and Threat Perception 
As noted in Chapter II, the U.S. has more reason to tighten the U.S.–ROK 
alliance in order to gain more aggregate power to cope with the rise of China and the 
uncertainty of its preponderance in the region. In addition, the strategic value of the ROK 
has increased beyond the Korean Peninsula. With the improved status of the ROK, the 
U.S. wants it to assume more security burdens, and participate in the regional and global 
issues in support of U.S. military operations, such as the war against terrorism. Especially, 
since the September 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. military capability has become “stretched 
thin as it fights global terrorism and leads international efforts to contain the proliferation 
and use of WMD.”152 In this context, in May 2005, Gen. Charles Cambell, Commander 
of the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea, publicly stated that “the U.S.–ROK alliance is 
transforming into a regional alliance and that the operational sphere of the U.S.–ROK 
joint forces can be extended to Northeast Asia.”153Also, North Korean WMD becomes a 
troublesome situation, having impacts not only on the peninsula but regionally and 
globally.154 As a member of the “axis of evil,” North Korea becomes not just a military 
threat to the Korean Peninsula, but also an element of instability in the region and a 
potential military threat to the continental United States with its nuclear weapons and 
missile development. Although it’s WMD and missile test were not successful, “the U.S. 
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is worried about the potential sale of nuclear material or weapons to groups such as Al 
Qaeda that would use such weapons on the U.S.”155  
b. The ROK’s Interest and Threat Perception 
On the other hand, the ROK threat perception has moved into a different 
direction from the U.S. First, the ROK eventually started to see North Korea as a failed 
rivalry, although it remains as a state of “rhetorical hostility,” which has served as the 
main driving force to unite the alliance. Although Pyongyang does not seem to show 
hostile intensions toward the South, the North’s ability to wage a full-scale conventional 
war has been significantly degraded since the 1980s due to a confluence of factors such 
as the economic failure, ideological defeat, famine, international isolation, and the 
South’s greatly surpassed expenditure in the defense. Also, South Korea’s great 
achievements in its economic development and political liberalization over the decades 
enable Seoul to approach the North with the greater national confidence.  
However, despite an incrementally decreasing threat of a major 
conventional war, North Korea remains a major threat, aiming its huge scale of 
conventional military toward the heart of South Korea. Also, North Korea’s growing 
emphasis on asymmetric military capabilities, especially a WMD program and low-
intensity conflicts, make the South difficult to countercheck such unbalanced aggression 
with its independent efforts. As an internationally responsible nation, Seoul must be 
restrained to possess nuclear arms to offset the North Korean WMD. Also, due to its 
economic scale, developing autonomous capabilities for intelligence collection, offensive 
symptom detection, a precision target strike is still premature for the ROK military. 
Therefore, the U.S. military presence, strategic intelligence, early warning assets, and 
nuclear umbrella are essential for the South, enabling it to contain Pyongyang’s hostile 
intention, and as an essential basis to approach it with confidence. 
The threat perception changes are not limited to North Korea but also 
toward China. From the end of the Korean War until recently, as a rigid ally of North 
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Korea, China was without official relations and had limited economic exchanges with 
South Korea. However, with the end of the Cold War, “China is no longer viewed as 
South Korea’s enemy.”156 Since normalization in 1992, the bilateral trade relationship 
has continued to grow at a double-digit annualized rate, “driven primarily by China’s 
increasing demands for Korean products in the electronics, computer, semiconductor, and 
telecommunication sectors.”157 China has surpassed the U.S. as South Korea’s number 
one trading partner since 2003, and based upon the successful economic relationship, 
they have expanded cultural exchanges and improved political relationships.158 Also, the 
emergence of China as a source of dynamic economic growth, as well as the 
diversification of its economic relationships, has provided South Korea with a new 
“centrifugal force” that lessens its perceived dependence on the U.S. Also, the 
burgeoning Sino–ROK economic relationship and its influence would encourage South 
Korea to regard relations with China as its own economic, security, and political interests 
in the long-term implications.159 However, on the regional level, there is no doubt that 
South Korea is one of the beneficiaries of the U.S. presence. Owing to the U.S. military, 
the ROK need not be drawn into the Sino-Japan conflict; at a minimum, it helps the ROK 
to exclude their conflict from the peninsula and to be free from their intervention and 
interference.  
2. Dynamics in the Abandonment and Entrapment in the Alliance 
Based on the difference of threat perception between the U.S. and ROK, the level 
of emphasized interest and policy priorities can be organized as in Table 11.  
Alliance Interest Threat Perception Changes toward PRC and DPRK 
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U.S. Regional Increased No Changes Increased 




Table 11.   Divergence Threat Perception Between the U.S. and ROK  
Primarily, the main threats of the U.S. and ROK are different from each other. 
Deterring North Korea from invading South Korea is no longer the obvious common 
alliance foundation for both countries, as South Korea’s relative dependence on the U.S. 
declined. Owing to the confidence based upon the superiority of the social, economic, 
and alliance capability, Seoul can autonomously approach the North with more 
diplomatic and reconciliatory policies. The more the South achieves superiority over the 
North, the more the U.S.–ROK alliance poses challenges to the ROK–U.S. political and 
military leaderships. Also, due to growing ties with China, potential strategic discord 
between the U.S. and China becomes highly undesirable for Seoul, and it tends not to 
stimulate Beijing’s political and security interest.160 However, the South’s dependence on 
the alliance will continue unless Seoul has totally independent security capabilities. With 
the only definite superiority in the conventional and asymmetry capability, the South is 
able to take the lead the inter-Korean relations when it executes any policy toward North 
Korea.  
Second, a policy focus of two countries aims at the different levels of 
international relations. The U.S. strategic focus in the alliance has moved from the 
peninsula to the region and to the globe, whereas the ROK wants the alliance to remain 
on the peninsula rather than be expanded to the region.161  From the South Korean 
perspective, the U.S.–ROK alliance must guarantee its security first unless the North 
Korean threat remains. Expanding the role of the alliance to the regional and global level 
is secondary to solving the North Korean problem, whereas the U.S. has priorities on the 
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broader issues rather than inter-Korean relations. In focusing on the level of differences, 
the problem of North Korea’s WMD arsenal, including a formidable ballistic missile 
inventory, gives different implications to the alliance in terms of choosing a policy and 
setting a priority.  
In short, the different threat perceptions and divergent levels of interest provide 
important policy implications in the alliance. According to the alliance security dilemma 
theory, both (the U.S. and ROK) have the abandonment fears from the partner’s potential 
defection, as well as ongoing entrapment fears from involvement in the partner’s security 
issues, which is secondary. The U.S. retains abandonment fears at the regional level from 
the ROK, whereas the ROK retains abandonment fears in the inter-Korean bilateral level 
from the U.S. Because both allies retain abandonment fears, they want to strengthen the 
alliance ties and show commitment. However, the entrapment fears for unwanted burdens 
by involving in partner’s priority area make each hesitate to participate in the ally’s 
security policies. Ironically, both allies have strong desire to maintain the alliance but 
weak motivation to commit its secondary interest but primary for the partner. This 
divergence produces discordance and inconsistent voices between allies while executing 
respective primary security strategy; and the collision of priorities generates friction for 
the effective execution of the security policy. 
3. Cases of Alliance Security Dilemma in the U.S.–ROK Alliance  
The following two events are representative cases that illustrate the divergence of 
priorities between the U.S. and ROK.  
a. TMD vs. KMD 
Divergence reveals many issues between U.S. and ROK alliances. One of 
the representative issues is the controversial participation for the U.S.-led Theater Missile 
Defense (TMD) program, which was suggested by Washington when North Korea 
launched the ballistic missile test in 1998. Superficially, it is designed to defend the North 
Korean missile threat, but the underlying purpose is aimed at China and Russia’s inter-
continental ballistic missiles, one of the crucial capabilities to neutralize the potential 
enemy’s second-strike capability. Thus, China and Russia oppose the TMD program and 
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regard it as a significant strategic threat. Therefore, participating in this global-level TMD 
program could stimulate China and entrap the ROK in the conflict between Washington 
and Beijing. In order to moderate such a problem, South Korean experts recommended 
limited participation in TMD, so-called Korean Missile Defense (KMD) separated from 
the U.S. TMD. Practically, the TMD system would not provide significant capabilities to 
the ROK for its defense because North Korea’s short-range missiles and long-range 
artillery are much more threatening than ballistic missiles within the proximity to the 
North. 162 The KMD only allows a low-tier defense system and does not join in any type 
of defense system targeting inter-continental ballistic missile-like long-range missiles. 
Thus, the KMD provides rationale not to participate in the TMD and convince China and 
Russia that the system is designed to defend, not offend. 
b. USFK Strategic Flexibility 
Another representative example is the debate for USFK’s strategic 
flexibility. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the U.S. has instigated a 
Global Defense Posture Review and defense transformation process of its forces abroad. 
The basic idea of strategic flexibility is that the U.S. is able to utilize its forces overseas 
more flexibly and efficiently by relocating USFK to other regions where the U.S. faces 
conflicts. It means the U.S. forces in Korea would be involved in regional and global 
missions beyond traditional peninsula deterrence missions.163 However, Seoul reacted 
sensitively to the strategic concept of the USFK’s possible withdrawal and involvement 
in the other regional conflicts. Indeed, the USFK’s flexibility bolstered South Korea’s 
fears of both abandonment and entrapment at the same time.164  
Primarily, the strategic flexibility and the overall realignment of the USFK 
could eventually weaken its deterrence capabilities for North Korean aggression. As a 
part of the its global strategy, the U.S. planned to reduce the USFK to 25,000 until 2008 
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and relocate the 2nd Infantry Division deployed near the DMZ to south of the Han River 
in the Osan and Pyeongtaek area through the realignment. With the concept of the 
realignment, many South Korean conservative analysts were concerned that the South 
would lose “tripwire,” which served as the U.S.’s automatic intervention in the case of 
full-scale war so that the U.S. defense commitment to South Korea becomes more 
ambiguous. Secondly, the USFK’s regional deployment might entrap Seoul into 
unintended regional conflict, such as a possible U.S.–China military conflict in the 
Taiwan Strait. Many South Korean and Chinese analysts have worried that a strategically 
flexible U.S. force may be primarily aimed at using in a Taiwan Strait contingency.165 
Also, the relocated USFK in the Osan and Pyeongtaek area will serve the role as a U.S. 
forward outpost and supply base to contain China166 to enhance the U.S. balancing 
capabilities.167 Although both states agreed to the Joint Statement that, “the U.S. respects 
the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia 
against the will of the Korean people,”168 the fear of “entrapment” prevailed in South 
Korean society. 
4. The Implication of the North Korean Nuclear Program for Sunshine 
Policy 
The clash of policy differences between the former progressive governments in 
the ROK and the Bush administration toward the North Korean WMD program and the 
Sunshine Policy are the most obvious cases showing the alliance’s sharply divided 
attitude toward the partner’s policy priorities, ultimately the inter-Korean reconciliation 
approach. First of all, divergent attitudes toward the Sunshine Policy are basically derived 
from the different levels of strategic interests over a North Korean nuclear program.  
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a. Two Different Attitudes Toward North Korean Nuclear Program 
The North Korean nuclear program is apparently threatening to the U.S., 
ROK and any other country in the region, but the level of intensity and scale of the 
perceived threat is different in each case. From the South Korean perspective, any 
possible armed conflict or nuclear war is an imminent, direct security issue that, than any 
other country, is a matter of life and death for South Koreans. Practically, if Pyongyang 
uses nuclear weapons for an actual military purpose, the devastating nuclear damage will 
occur on the Korean soil and among South Korean people. Thus, the denuclearization in 
the Korean Peninsula should be regarded as one of vital interest. However, because of the 
proximity, endured rivalry, and animosity with the South, the North Korean nuclear 
weapons cannot be a separated threat capability from the rest of its military forces, the 
world’s fifth largest conventional armed forces, biological and chemical weapons, and a 
large amount of artillery pieces aiming at Seoul.169 Also, the conflict involved in nuclear 
weapons will not be a limited war without intervention of conventional forces and vice 
versa. North Korea already possesses enough military capability to possibly inflict huge 
casualties and devastating costs on South Korea, in addition to the nuclear weapons. 
Technically, the demarcation between the devastation of conventional war versus nuclear 
war is ambiguous for Seoul. 
Also, there is a somewhat naïve belief that North Korea will not use the 
nuclear weapons on the same Korean people and Korean soil that it ultimately wants to 
occupy and rule.170 In addition, many analysts argue that Pyongyang well recognizes the 
fact that the second Korean War will definitely terminate its regime, so the main purpose 
of nuclear weapons should be as a last resort to defend the regime, or just a bargaining 
chip to negotiate for begging more assistance.171 Thus, it is unwise to drive Pyongyang to 
the last corner to use the nuclear weapons while Kim Jong-Il regime has no real intention 
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of using it. Thus, for South Korea, deterring North Korean hostile intention and removing 
any possibility of war is the first priority, rather than preventing the nuclear proliferation 
and transference its technology. In this context, raising spiral tension and the possibility 
of war by stimulating and provoking North Korea, such as participation in sanctions, 
would induce much higher risks and costs than participating in the U.S.-led non-
proliferation policy. 
On the other hand, for the U.S., the North Korean nuclear program is not 
only the issue limited to the inter-Korean conflict, the nuclear and missile problem is 
complicatedly related to its global strategy and security relations for the non-proliferation 
from Northeast Asia to Middle East.172 Also, based on the global war on terrorism, the 
Bush administration’s primary interest was to prevent the proliferation of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons, and especially, the North Korean nuclear weapons and technology 
could transfer to other rogue states and terrorist organizations. Compromising can be a 
touchstone for other rogue states and terrorist groups trying to possess WMD. 
Furthermore, it might induce a spiraling security dilemma in the region, and if its allies 
seek their own nuclear deterrence, the U.S.’s strategic status as a nuclear protector would 
be weakened. Therefore, from the U.S. perspective, allowing or acknowledging the North 
Korean nuclear weapons is not an acceptable option. Under the divergent threats and 
interests between the U.S. and ROK, they would choose a different path of policies for 
the solution. 
b. Two Different Attitudes Toward the Engagement Policy 
Based upon the strategic calculation, as well known, the Kim Dae Jung 
and Roh Moo Hyun administrations had tenaciously pursued a comprehensive 
engagement policy toward their archrival, North Korea. Kim and Roh believed that a 
long-term peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas is not only desirable but also 
possible while pursuing the “Sunshine Policy” that emphasizes economic engagement 
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over military strength and accommodation rather than confrontation.173 The centerpiece 
of the reconciliation strategy is that if the South solves the broader “North Korea 
problem,” the nuclear issue also will be solved, as well as the ongoing South-North 
confrontation. Indeed, this reconciliatory political tendency did not suddenly emerge 
from the romantic nationalist movement of the progressive government. Since the Roh 
Tae-woo administration’s northern politick, there have been continuous conciliatory 
approaches toward the North. Also, his successor, President Kim Young Sam, would 
have been the first national hero who realized the inter-Korean summit meeting were it 
not for Kim Il-Sung’s sudden death just few months before the dialogue. Thus, from 
Seoul’s perspective, the hard-line policy was not acceptable because it would have 
threatened the progress made by South Korea over the past decade 174  and would 
deteriorate the crisis environment between the two Koreas. 
On the other hand, the apparent interest displayed by the Bush 
administration early in its tenure was fostering Pyongyang’s collapse or the use of 
military force against the North Korean nuclear program. Washington’s hard-line policy 
not only reflected the chronic fatigue from negotiating with Pyongyang, but also the 
confidence as a unilateral super power in the world and the urgency with which it 
confronted the new type of national threat. From Washington’s perspective, the 
“Sunshine Policy” that Seoul’s autonomous efforts to engage Pyongyang was 
contradictory to the U.S. global strategy to prevent the non-proliferation and impose 
sanctions on the North to dismantle the North Korean nuclear program. Also, it was a 
suspicious movement, combined with a closer relationship with China, which could 
accelerate the disintegration of the U.S.–ROK alliance. Thus, the U.S. would more 
hesitate to take part in the South’s engagement policy.  
In short, the divergent threat perception and different levels of interest 
produce the asymmetric fear of abandonment and entrapment from the U.S. and ROK, 
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and it induces each ally to take a different approach toward the inter-Korean issues. This 
disagreement over approaches to North Korea was based not on emotions but on national 
interests: Seoul has focused on avoiding collapse in North Korea while Washington has 
focused on nuclear nonproliferation.175 Based upon the interest difference, the U.S. and 
ROK refused to take a harder line or the “Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea, and it 
has led to increased friction between Seoul and Washington.176 Unless the U.S.–ROK 
alliance finds common interest again, it will be difficult to have a consistent political 
voice.  
D. THE ALLIANCE SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE PRC–DPRK 
ALLIANCE 
As explained in the Chapter II, the inter-Korean reconciliation issue is secondary 
for the PRC and DPRK. Thus, regardless of the alliance security dilemma, the 
reconciliation issues will not be a primary agenda item in the alliance, even though both 
officially support the peaceful inter-Korean engagement. However, the different 
perspectives and strategic priorities between the PRC and DPRK hinder the alliance from 
having a consistent political choice. The asymmetric abandonment and entrapment fears 
in the alliance prevent either state from choosing the other spectrum of policy, away from 
partner’s interest, thus it is difficult to change the status quo. 
1. Brief of History of PRC-DPRK Alliance  
As a communist brotherhood, with ideological and cultural affinity, the PRC and 
DPRK fought shoulder-to-shoulder against the “imperialist American invasion”177 from 
1950 to 1953. This relationship of “flesh and blood” was officially upgraded through the 
“PRC–DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” in 1961. During 
the Cold War, the PRC–DPRK alliance was organically structured into several levels. 
Firstly, both countries shared a common adversary, the U.S.–ROK alliance under the 
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Cold-War structure. Secondly, the geological proximity provided the PRC with a “crucial 
buffer” 178
 
against U.S. military intervention, whereas it provided the DPRK with a 
credible military capability for well-timed intervention. Thirdly, the DPRK was an 
important leverage and ideological legitimacy for the PRC to counterbalance the Soviet 
Union while deepening the Sino-Soviet Conflict. Also, for the DPRK, PRC’s recognition 
as a state was an essential legitimacy to maintain the Kim Il-sung regime.179 Finally, the 
similarity of the Marxism-Leninism economic system and ideological political system 
helped them to share the same identity as a communist state.  
However, since Deng Xiaoping ambitiously launched political, economic, and 
social reform, and the “open-door policy,”180
 
and Beijing normalized diplomatic relations 
with Washington in 1979, the DPRK’s strategic value as an alliance eventually decreased. 
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War prompted the PRC–DPRK alliance to lose common 
ground and maintain the security relations. First of all, the PRC restored friendly relations 
with the Soviet Union in 1989, had improved relations with the U.S., and officially 
normalized diplomatic relations with the ROK in 1992 while Pyongyang was still 
maintaining a confrontational attitude toward the U.S.–ROK alliance. Also, their 
ideological and economic similarity gap had gotten wider as China successfully 
accomplished economic development. Moreover, with fast-growing economic 
interdependence, and political and military ties with the ROK, the PRC no longer 
regarded South Korea as a potential enemy. From 1992 to 1999, while the PRC–ROK 
summit meetings were held several times, there had not been high-level meetings 
between the PRC and DPRK.181 Without sharing a common interest and enemy, the 
PRC–DPRK alliance significantly deteriorated. 
On the other hand, the PRC began to reevaluate the strategic importance of the 
DPRK as the U.S. strengthened its alliance ties and commitment in Northeast Asia. The 
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strained PRC–DPRK relations significantly improved with Chinese Foreign Minister 
Tang Jiaxuan’s visit to Pyongyang in 1999.182  Behind the rapprochement between PRC–
DPRK relations, there were the U.S.’s visualized balancing policies against China, such 
as the U.S.–Japan’s “the New Defense Guideline,” and agreement of Japan on the U.S.-
led TMD system in 1998. Also, the U.S.–DPRK relations after the missile launch had 
significantly improved. As the U.S.–PRC rivalry became evident, Beijing actively sought 
counterbalancing measures, such as raising the status of Sino–Russia relations as a 
strategic partnership. In this context, the DPRK’s increased strategic value for the PRC 
and the necessity for survival for DPRK revitalized the traditional PRC–DPRK alliance. 
2. The PRC-DPRK Alliance and the Alliance Security Dilemma 
a. The PRC-DPRK Threat Perception 
Based upon the PRC–DPRK alliance’s threat perception since the late 
1990s, the alliance security dilemma can be illustrated as in Figure 12. In comparison to 
the U.S.–ROK alliance, the PRC and DPRK have similar divergences regarding the 
security threat perception that produces asymmetric entrapment and abandonment fear to 
both sides. For China, the most important strategic value of the DPRK as an ally is an 
asset to check the U.S. hegemonic intention. DPRK’s hostile attitude toward the U.S. 
provides important diplomatic leverage and strategic implication to the PRC, while 
competing with the U.S. Thus, to some extent, Beijing would willingly accept North 
Korean provocations as long as they do not disturb the strategic interests. Other than that, 
China is reluctant to take additional risks of being entrapped in North Korean problems. 
Especially, Pyongyang’s hostile actions toward South Korea would strain the PRC–ROK 
strategic relations, which also cannot be abandoned. Also, Beijing hesitates to take the 
burden by providing much support to Kim Jong-Il regime because of its rampant 
irregularities and corruption in the economic system; the provision of assistance is like 
filling a bottomless vessel and would divert the aid to hostile purposes, which Beijing 
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does not want.183 Furthermore, Beijing does not want Pyongyang to increase the regional 
tensions beyond the level its interest permits, which would disturb the stability of the 
economic environment and raise an issue demanding the role of China as the responsible 
stakeholder in the international community. Thus, the PRC’s support would remain at the 
minimum level, which sustains the dependence of Pyongyang on Beijing. 
Threat Perception Changes toward U.S. and ROK 
Alliance 
Interest 
Focus U.S. ROK 
PRC Regional Increased Decreased 
DPRK Peninsula No Change Increased 
Table 12.   Alliance Security Dilemma between the PRC and DPRK 
On the other hand, for Pyongyang, China is the most important ally, 
providing essential support and aid to its volatile regime. Thanks to the assistance, 
Pyongyang could deviate from the international pressure and the South’s peaceful 
offensive. However, Pyongyang is afraid of Beijing’s overwhelming influence over them. 
The greater the Pyongyang depended on Beijing, the greater the restraints on their 
freedom of action. Furthermore, because of its divergent threat perception from Beijing, 
Pyongyang has fundamentally different strategic interests.  First of all, although its 
primary rivalry is South Korea, Beijing’s commitment toward the inter-Korean issue is 
unreliable for Pyongyang. 184  Secondly, Pyongyang seems to have an interest in 
conciliating with the U.S. rather than provoking it. From Pyongyang’s perspective, the 
diplomatic normalization with the U.S. is one of the ultimate goals in an effort to acquire 
the guarantee for regime survival, and normalization can delink the U.S.–ROK alliance in 
order to weaken the unity of the alliance aimed at Pyongyang. In this context, the North 
prefers to have dialogue directly with the U.S. rather than participating in the six-party 
talks, without the PRC’s presence. Indeed, in the negotiation process with the U.S., they 
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expressed the importance of the U.S. presence in the region even after the reunification 
several times. In short, Beijing has more abandonment fears on the issues of the U.S. 
from Pyongyang’s strategic approach whereas Pyongyang is afraid of being abandoned 
when it confronts with the South.  
b. North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program 
The North Korean nuclear weapons program is a complicated issue 
stretching over the regional level to the inter-Korean issues. From Pyongyang’s 
perspective, the nuclear weapons would be important strategic assets providing security 
capability and diplomatic status, which serves well the desire for regime survival. 
However, because of its great impact on the region, it is almost impossible for Pyongyang 
to acquire such valuable strategic assets without the neighboring countries’ agreement, 
especially the U.S., which has the will and capability to frustrate Pyongyang’s intension. 
Thus, North Korea’s primary goal toward having the nuclear weapons would be 
dependent upon on negotiations with the U.S. to acquire authorization.185 Among various 
prospects for Pyongyang’s negotiation cards, one of the most plausible scenarios of 
negotiations between the U.S. and DPRK is that Pyongyang would have to be willing to 
trade its strategic assets and position with the nuclear weapons. In other words, while 
insisting that the primary purpose of the nuclear weapons is limited only to the peninsula, 
if Washington allows nuclear programs, Pyongyang will accept the station of the U.S. 
forces on the peninsula as well as forsaking the mid-long-range missile programs.  
From Beijing’s perspective, the North Korean nuclear program is also a 
dilemmatic issue intertwined with the fear of abandonment and entrapment. Primarily, 
the North Korean nuclear problem provides a political card enabling Beijing to take an 
influential role in the process of solving the issue against the U.S. in the region. However, 
permitting Pyongyang to have nuclear weapons and negotiate bilaterally with the U.S. is 
not tolerable because it would raise the abandonment fear of the PRC.186 If Pyongyang 
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succeeds to retain nuclear weapons, its security dependence on the PRC would 
significantly decrease, while the motivation of defection would increase. Also, the 
rapprochement with the U.S. and negotiations for its presence on the peninsula would 
deepen the imbalance of power competition in the regional structure. Indeed, the PRC’s 
proactive effort to improve relations with Pyongyang was triggered by U.S.–DPRK 
rapprochement. Since Pyongyang negotiated bilaterally with Washington in 1998 for the 
Kumchang-ri nuclear facility, Taepodong missile lunch and fulfillment of the Basic 
Agreement of 1994, North Korea attempted to normalize U.S.–DPRK relations during the 
last period of the Clinton administration. 
North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program 
 
Bilateral Negotiation Multilateral 
Negotiation 
Imposing Sanction 
US-DPRK Rapprochement Enhancing US Position 
PRC Abandonment Fear 
Restraining 
US-DPRK Entrapment Fear 
Table 13.   Alliance Security Dilemma between the PRC and DPRK 
On the other hand, the PRC does not want enlarged tensions that would 
bring the U.S. and its allies into the confrontation, so that entraps China into conflicts and 
minimizes the legitimacy and influence. Thus, when Pyongyang’s actions for the nuclear 
program get beyond Beijing’s limits, Beijing participates in international sanctions in 
order for the legitimacy as the responsible stakeholder and restraining the North’s 
intolerable actions. However, Beijing opposes the U.S.-led hard-line approach as the 
punishment in order to prevent the U.S. initiatives in the region and keep Pyongyang 
dependent on the PRC. Beijing’s position was clearly revealed in the process of resolving 
North Korea’s declaration of withdrawal from the NPT (Jan. 10, 2003) and the second 
and third nuclear crises sparked by the nuclear test (Oct. 9, 2006). Although China was 
working closely with the U.S. to resolve the nuclear issue, the PRC opposed the U.S.’s 
hard-line measures both times. In other words, while emphasizing the principle of the 
“denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and “peaceful resolution through dialogue” 
on the North Korean nuclear issue, Beijing attempted to undercut the U.S.’s hard-line 
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response and restrain North Korea at the same time. For example, when Pyongyang 
ignored Beijing’s advance warning and proceeded with the nuclear test in October 2006, 
Beijing clearly opposed the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)—searching or 
seizing the suspicious North Korean ship—although it was in favor of the UN Security 
Council Resolution (1718) banning the import of suspected substances into North Korea. 
In short, the PRC does not want to be involved in unwanted disputes with the U.S. due to 
abrupt behavior on the part of North Korea, and it also does not want to lose the strategic 
interest with North Korea’s bandwagoning to the U.S. In this context, the PRC prefers the 
multilateral approach—the Six Party Talk—toward the North Korean nuclear program 
because it enables Beijing to maintain influence in the process of dialogue, while drawing 
the U.S. into the framework providing the U.S.–PRC equal status and restraining North 
Korea’s brinkmanship tactics.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Since the end of the Cold War, the two sets of alliance coalitions faced a 
significantly changed security environment that altered the treat perception of the four 
players; the cohesion of the alliance generally weakened in comparison to the Cold War 
era. Therefore, the four players had different priorities and interests from those of its 
partner, and it made the alliance difficult to have a consistent voice on any ally’s security 
interests. In this context, in the U.S.–ROK alliance, the U.S. showed reluctance toward 
the ROK’s engagement policy toward North Korea, while the ROK refused to take part in 
the U.S.–led sanction on the North Korean nuclear program. As a result of the divergent 
approaches, neither policy acquired explicit achievement in their respective interests.  
Also, for the PRC–DPRK alliance, the asymmetric abandonment and entrapment fear 
prevent both states from forming progressive or violent policies. Beijing would not allow 
Pyongyang to take a conciliatory attitude toward the U.S. and brinkmanship tactics in 
order to avoid the abandonment and entrapment problem. In addition, despite 
Pyongyang’s abandonment fear derived from Beijing’s ambiguous commitment to seek 
the security guarantees for the regime, such as nuclear weapons and normalization with 
the U.S., dependence on the PRC restrains itself in the context of the U.S.–China rivalry. 
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Such inconsistent policies between allies work as the great friction, preventing the status 
quo—the continuity of the division—from changing.   
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IV. THE VICIOUS CYCLE OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN 
THE FOUR PLAYERS AND THE CONTINUITY OF CONFLICT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapters explored how rivalry and alliance relations influence 
inter-Korean reconciliation. Obviously, both relational links produce friction between 
allies and rivalries, and work as impediments to conciliatory movement between the two 
Koreas. However, those relational linkages do not exist separately. As the inter-Korean 
rivalry is closely related to the U.S.–PRC rivalry, the U.S.–ROK alliance is 
interconnected with the PRC–DPRK alliance. Also, these relational linkages further 
connect one player with its ally’s rivalry or rivalry’s ally, even when the relationship is 
neither ally nor rivalry. As noted in the introduction, because of the relational linkages 
between two sets of alliances and rivalries, the four players are closely interconnected 
with each other, so that each player’s strategic movements has influences on the three 
others, directly or indirectly. In other words, impact produces a chain reaction, along with 
the relational linkages and ripple effects spreading out toward inter-Korean relations. 
In this respect, this chapter attempts to verify how the interaction between four 
players’ relations influences the inter-Korean reconciliation. Particularly, the point is 
focused on the negative dynamics of chain reaction and ripple effect, which protracts 
tensions and conflicts among the players, especially between South and North Korea. 
Thus, this chapter focuses on how the North Korean provocation impacts the four players, 
and, ultimately, inter-Korean reconciliation. In order to examine the dynamics of the 
interaction between the four player’s security relations effectively, this chapter briefly 
explores relative theoretical concepts for the basis of discussion: the adversary-alliance 
game and antagonistic interdependence. It then investigates the four players’ 
interconnectedness (vicious cycle) and motivation for allowing conflicts (turning the 
cycle) within the respective theoretical framework. Finally, it verifies the implication of 
the interconnectedness by applying these theories, mainly on the cases of the “ROKS 
Cheonan” and “Bombardment of Yeonpyeong.” 
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B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE ADVERSARY–ALLIANCE 
GAME AND THE ANTAGONISTIC DEPENDENCE 
1. Interdependence and Interconnectedness 
For the explanation of the interaction between states, there are two crucial 
concepts this paper uses: interdependence and interconnectedness between states. First, 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye define interdependence as “situations characterized by 
reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.” 187  The 
interdependence between states is the frequently used concept in the liberal theory, which 
emphasizes intricately intertwined economic relations with trade. They believe the 
balanced or imbalanced dependence on a counterpart’s economy could spill over to the 
security arena positively or negatively. However, the economic interdependence does not 
adequately explain the positive security interdependence (i.e., between allies) and the 
negative security interdependence (i.e., between adversaries). As thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter III, alliance’s cohesion—an important connection binding allies—is determined 
by the degree of the interdependence on the threat and interest. Thus, it is basically a 
positive connection force generated from mutually virtuous relations. On the other hand, 
there is also negative dependence indicating tense, conflictual relations provide benefits. 
One can postulate that if a state’s interest depends on negative relations, the negativity 
tends to continue. Further details will be discussed in the following sections as a concept 
of antagonistic dependence.  
The other important pillar for the interaction between states is interconnectedness. 
Robert Jervis defines interconnectedness as “the fates of the units and their relations with 
others are strongly influenced by interactions at other places and at earlier periods of 
time.”188 In terms of security affairs, the interconnectedness means security issues and 
their impacts are cross-border, cross-sector, multi-stakeholder affairs. Jervis identifies 
interconnectedness between state’s interactions: “If relations between A and B change, so 
will relations between A and C and between B and C, often producing subsequent 
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changes in the relations between A and B.”189 Furthermore, when interconnection are 
dense, the system is more complex, and it becomes difficult to trace the impact and hard 
to control. Also, because most security “systems have been designed to cope with 
adversity,” the extensive interconnections makes it able to prevent great disturbance. 
However, it also means that “disruptions could spread throughout the system,” because 
what happens in one place affects many others. Moreover, Jervis noted, “some 
arrangement of connections will make a system resistant to change” 190  because dense 
interconnectedness prevents small and slow adjustment, unless several others do.  
2. The Adversary and Alliance Game and the Inter-Korean 
Reconciliation 
The most important linkages connecting and defining relations of the four players 
are rivalry and alliance. The directly related theory explaining the interaction between 
two relational linkages is Snyder’s “adversary and alliance game.” Throughout Chapter II 
and Chapter III, this paper explored adversary game (rivalry) and alliance game (alliance 
security dilemma). Briefly, the adversary game means determining whether to show firm 
stance or not toward adversary, whereas the alliance game means determining whether 
support is its ally. Beyond those separate works, Snyder found that the 
interconnectedness between the alliance and adversary game are:  
Allies are dealing with their adversary at the same time they are dealing 
with each other. The alliance and adversary games proceed simultaneously 
and complement each other in various ways. Strategies and tactics in the 
alliance game will have direct effects in that game, but also side effects in 
the adversary game—and vice versa. Strategy choices in either game must 
therefore take account of both kinds of effects.191 
As Snyder argues, a state’s strategic decisions cannot be excluded from either the 
adversary or alliance game. Simply, in the dynamics of alliance and adversary, states are 
interchanging influences with each other. Similar to a security dilemma, the magnitude of 
an alliance’s cohesion depends on the intensity of adversary’s threat; therefore, an 
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adversaries’ security posture is largely determined by the threat perception derived from 
the rival’s alliance. However, imbalance of the threat perception and interest between 
allies produces an asymmetric commitment, so that adversaries’ response show is 
imbalanced with respect to alliance members. Therefore, while interchanging influence 
between allies and rivalries, “strategies in each game can have desirable or undesirable 
side effects in the other.” 192  Snyder illustrated the interconnectedness between the 
adversary and alliance game and its possible consequences in Table 14. According to the 
theory, before choosing a strategic decision—strengthening commitment to ally or not 
and taking a firm stance toward adversary or not—the player should consider expansive 
consequences because specific policy designed to achieve “Good” may also produce 
unwanted “Bad” as by-products.  




1. Reduce risk of abandonment 
2. Increase risk of entrapment 
1. Foreclose realignment 
2. Solidify adversary’s alliance 
I Adversary Game: 
Strand Firm 
1. Deter, or Prevail over, adversary 
1. Provoke adversary; increase  
    tension; insecurity spiral 
Alliance Game: 
Weaken Commitment 
1. Reduce risk of entrapment 
2. Restrain ally 
3. Preserve realignment option 
4. Divide adversary’s alliance 
1. Increase risk of abandonment 
2. Reduce reputation for loyalty 
II 
Adversary Game: 
Conciliate 1. Resolve conflict; reduce tension 
1. Encourage adversary to stand  
    firmer 
2. Reduce reputation for resolve 
Table 14.   The Composite Dilemma in a Multipolar System193 
From the theory, the most notable dilemmas it can draw out for the inter-Korean 
reconciliation are that either the firm or the conciliatory stance is difficult to achieve 
respective to the original purpose—deterrence and reconciliation. Firstly, augmenting 
military capabilities and the strengthening alliances may deter an adversary, but can be 
read by it as an offensive measure designed to undermine its own security, thereby 
encouraging it to take countermeasures. Then, it may further trigger a general upward 
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spiraling of tensions and insecurities—“that is, a vicious circle of unnecessary power 
competition.”194 On the other hand, the escalated tension raises the entrapment fears of 
its ally and become a friction which prevents commitment to the alliance. In the same 
vein, a conciliatory policy and weakening commitment to an alliance may help resolve 
conflict and appease tensions with an adversary, but also it could encourage him to take 
advantage from weak resoluteness.195 Furthermore, it raises abandonment fears from the 
ally, so that it also works as friction to suspend commitment to it. As shown in Table 14, 
under the alliance and adversary game, any unilateral policy produces paradoxical 
situations for the inter-Korean reconciliation in which the desirable and undesirable 
effects coexist. 
 
Figure 7.  Applied the Composite Dilemma (Case I) on the Four Players 
As a representative example, if it applies Case I (in Table 14) to the configuration 
of four players’ game on the Peninsula, the possible feature will be like Figure 7. The 
figure illustrates the case that the ROK takes strong stance toward the DPRK while 
receiving strong commitment from the U.S. Despite the abbreviate form, it well shows 
the interconnectedness of the policy choices of the U.S.-ROK, the reaction of the PRC-
DPRK, and paradoxical problem faced by taking respective strategy. From such 
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interconnected configuration, it can postulate that any four player’s strategic movement 
toward alliance and adversary generates desirable effects and undesirable effects for 
alliance, adversary and inter-Korean reconciliation. 
2. The Antagonistic Interdependence 
As noted preceding section, the other important source for states’ interaction is 
interdependence. This paper investigates negative dependency (from now on antagonistic 
dependence) seeking benefits from conflictual relations, tension and mutual hostility that 
would protract conflict and tension between the four players, especially the two Koreas. 
This section finds two types of antagonistic dependences: dependence of the four players 
on conflict between ally and its rival and dependence of Kim Jung-Il regime and South 
Korean conservatives on mutual hostility. 
a. Antagonistic Dependence on Partner’s Conflictual Relations 
In Chapter III, this paper previously explored the positive dependence 
between allies. The ally’s dependence is the main factor determining cohesiveness of an 
alliance, so that “when mutual dependence is high, the alliance will be cohesive; when it 
is low, the alliance will be fragile.”196 In order words, the dependence in the alliance 
works to bind states within a security framework and influences its strategic movement. 
On the other hand, basically, the existence and cohesiveness of the alliance are dependent 
on the threat. In other words, paradoxically, threat helps to sustain the alliance.  
However, when an alliance shares sole or symmetric, mutual threats, allies 
may not have friction to strengthen a commitment toward alliance, as threat surges or 
dissolves the alliance as threat weakens. Thus, in this case, the allies’ security problem 
and solution is consistent so that there is no antagonistic dependence between them. 
However, if an alliance shares an asymmetric threat perception, allies will confront an 
alliance security dilemma and have friction to execute respective security policy toward 
their primary threats. Therefore, in order to draw out commitment from the partner in this 
case, a state needs to make its primary adversary to its ally’s main threat also, or the 
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partner has its own conflict in retaining the necessity of the alliance’s assistance. In other 
words, the conflictual situation in which the partner needs alliance capability will 
increase its counterpart’s leverage over the ally so that it helps to execute its primary 
security policy. That is, the state becomes dependent on the partner’s conflict for seeking 
its security. 
In the case of the four players, the two sets of alliance coalitions and 
rivalries with asymmetric threat perception and different level of interests produce 
paradoxical dependence between them. For example, the ROK needs alliance against the 
North Korean conventional military rather than the potential PRC threat or the North 
Korean WMD. However, the U.S.’s necessity of the alliance more lied on the PRC and 
North Korean WMD rather than the North Korean conventional military. This asymmetry 
of threat generates divergent dependence and policy priorities between the U.S. and ROK. 
Basically in this case, both countries need the counterpart’s confrontation with their 
respective rivalries to maintain the alliance for respective security reason. If one party’s 
threat perception declines while the other party’s threat is remaining, the alliance 
becomes dependent on the former one’s conflict to sustain it. In other words, these 
asymmetric dependencies on the threat perception produce the antagonistic dependence, 
which refers to the situation in which four players depend on tensions or confrontations 
between its ally and ally’s rivalry, and then use such situations to tighten the alliance, 




Figure 8.  Antagonistic Dependence between the Four Players 
Figure 8 illustrates the antagonistic dependence between four players on 
the partner’s confrontation to have leverage over respective allies and maintain the 
alliance. The signs on the figure refer to each confrontation and dependence 
(Confrontation (I): the U.S.–PRC rivalry, Confrontation (II): the ROK–DPRK, 
Confrontation (III): the U.S.–DPRK WMD issue) of the four players. In this situation, if 
the alliance partner’s tension do not cost too much for the involvement, each of the four 
players would gain benefits from the alliance partner’s tension with respect to their 
adversary game, especially when its risk of abandonment is high. For example, in 1976, 
when the abandonment fear prevailed in South Korea, the axe murder incident—North 
Korean soldiers killed two U.S. army officers in the Joint Security Area (JSA)—
paradoxically helped Seoul to be reassured by the U.S.’s firm stance to the North Korean 
attack. 197  While providing strong commitment to the U.S., the atmosphere in the ROK 
seemed to welcome such opportunity to support the U.S.  
The ROK was generally satisfied with the apparent outcome of the crisis 
according to one account, and particularly pleased with the [task force part 
of the] operation and their participation in it. The immediate deployment 
of U.S. forces to Korea…impressed the South Koreans with the sincerity 
of the US commitment to the ROK.  In the streets, the solid bond between 
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Americans and their Korean hosts grew even stronger.  All of South Korea 
realized that they had witnessed a rare event in which they had played a 
key part—North Korea had lost face in the world’s eyes.198 
Even though the incident brought the crisis into the peninsula, for Seoul, 
such moderate level of tension between the U.S. and its adversary helped the ROK to 
guarantee the commitment from the U.S. without costing too much.  
b. Antagonistic Interdependence Between South and North Korea 
Another important dependence linkage is the South and North Korean 
antagonistic interdependence, derived from the distinctive characteristics of the shared 
dual identities between two Koreas (as a state and as a same ethnicity). As examined in 
Chapter II, the dual identity generates the incompatible legitimacy competition between 
two Koreas. From the same ethnic and nationalistic perspective, both Koreas 
acknowledge the reunification as the ultimate goal, but it is a problem for the state 
identity because the counterpart can be an alternative political system substituting 
respective regimes. Thus, the two Koreas inherently compete with each other for the sole 
legitimacy and political system in the peninsula. Under the division structure, both 
Koreas are pursuing contradictive objectives that regard “division as an important means 
for maintaining political power while paradoxically, stressing incessantly the importance 
of unification almost as a matter of course.”199 
The division structure in which both Koreas share the same ethnic identity 
but have antithetic political entities has created unique dynamics and interdependence. 
Within the Cold War framework, as incompatible rivalries, both Koreas had established 
its identity through comparing with the other’s behavior and seeing itself reflected from 
action and reaction of the counterpart (mirror image effect), so called “interfacial 
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dynamics.” 200  Thus, both Koreas’ influences are mutually entangled while building 
respective nation, excluding physically, and embracing identically the other at the same 
time. Thus, choosing any security and foreign policy influenced the behavior of the other 
side, and then it returned to itself. This “interfacial” relationship has produced the 
paradoxical coexistence and dependence between the antagonistic authoritarian regimes 
and conservative factions in both countries, so called the “antagonistic interdependent 
relations” or “symbiotic antagonism.”201 In the antagonistic interdependent relations, the 
counterpart’s antagonistic existence helped the two Koreas to intensify “domestic” 
integration, thus the “relational” antagonism has been the desired element to some extent 
to the conservative factions in domestic politics. In short, the two Korea’s confrontation 
has generated paradoxical dynamics of deterrence and dependence on antagonism. 
In this context, the South and the North have created tensions or 
engineered confrontations against their counterpart and then used the resultant situation 
to strengthen domestic unity and enhance the integration, legitimacy or stabilization of 
political power.202 Nevertheless, the antagonistic interdependence exists today between 
the Kim Jong-Il regime and the South’s conservative parties most opposing North Korea. 
Antagonistic rhetoric is commonly found in North Korean statements for the purpose of 
tightening its domestic unity, whereas, in South Korean domestic politics, the 
“communist rhetoric” still prevailed in the society. Indeed, the conservative parties 
receive reflective benefits from North Korean hostilities and provocations because these 
raise its political status and justification for security policy. In this respect, regulating 
tight vigilance helps not only to repel a counterpart’s hostility but also sustain a 
counterpart’s regime and strengthen the conservative faction’s status. As one of the 
representative examples, the Chongpoong (Gun Wind) case became a sensitive issue 
during the presidential election campaign in 1997 in that the conservative party’s few 
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officials asked Pyongyang to provoke armed demonstration in order to lead the favorable 
election.203  
C. THE VICIOUS CYCLE OF THE CONFRONTATION TRIGGERED BY 
NORTH KOREAN PROVOCATIONS 
The interconnectedness and antagonistic dependence between four players 
produce the vicious cycle of the strained relations triggering chain reactions when 
negative security problems occur. The relational linkages between the four players—
rivalry and alliance—provide interconnectedness and a route allowing influence to spread 
out, but these four are intertwined with antagonistic dependence entrenching the 
problems and straining relations. Generally, the DPRK is the main source of trouble, 
causing most of problems throughout the region. During past two decades, the other 
players seem to be embedded in the North Korean issue but could not generate viable 
solutions to restrain Pyongyang or even reach consensus for cooperation to prevent 
struggles within them. However, the crisis triggered by the DPRK often provides benefit 
not only to itself but also to the other players, to some extent. This section discusses for 
what reasons Pyongyang continuously seeks to provoke and why such ruthless 
provocation is allowed among other players.  
1. The Linkages of the Vicious Cycle 
According to the adversary and alliance game (as illustrated Figure 7), problems 
caused by Pyongyang have ripple effects. Typically, North Korean provocation can be 
distinguished into the two categories: the conventional military provocation (bilateral 
level) and WMD provocation (regional level). Because these issues have different 
influence radius, impacts triggered by North Korean provocations tend to follow different 
consecutive routes. Figure 9 and 10 postulate the most typical situation for the four 
players, when North Korea causes conventional military provocation and WMD 
provocations. Whether Pyongyang’s intension is to receive economical support, draw out 
recession in the security affairs or strengthen its internal unity, the further influence of the 
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provocation depends on the other players’ responses to it. Figure 9 shows how the cycle 
of the negative impacts circulates into the four players. In this diagram, if each state 
chooses ① option, it will triggers a following reaction from the next relationally linked 
player, whereas choosing ② option stops the further spread of the ripple effect. 
 
Figure 9.  Vicious Cycle Triggered by Conventional Military Provocation 
In simplistic terms for the vicious cycle of Figure 9, if Pyongyang provokes 
armed conflict toward the South, then Seoul will take firm countermeasures toward the 
North, and the inter-Korean relations will be strained. As the ally is attacked, the U.S. 
provides political and military assistance to Seoul and takes all possible measures to 
suppress Pyongyang. While strengthening commitment, the U.S.–ROK alliance becomes 
more tightened, and Washington’s influence on the peninsula increases, but it means 
jeopardizing the Beijing’s strategic status. Then, the PRC will seek possible measures to 
counterbalance the U.S.’s increased influence. As part of the countermeasures, Beijing 
also strengthens ties with the DPRK by providing support and protection. With the 
increased safety and raised strategic status, Pyongyang can deviate from its responsibility 




Figure 10.  Vicious Cycle Triggered by WMD Provocation 
On the other hand, the North Korean WMD provocation has a somewhat different 
process in comparison to the conventional military provocation. Because of its regional 
level impacts, the provocation directly stimulates the U.S. rather than the ROK. Thus, in 
the process of problem solving, the U.S. gets directly involved in the North Korean issue, 
and seeks deterrence measures and international cooperation, especially from the ROK. 
In the face of U.S. pressure, the PRC would response similarly to the conventional 
provocation case—support and protect—and the DPRK also would get similar effects 
from the provocation. Under the U.S. demand, the ROK should decide whether it 
participates in the U.S.-led sanctions or not. If it participates, the inter-Korean relations 
are further strained. However, the notable thing is that the ROK’s position to North 
Korean WMD provocation is not the biggest determinant in this cycle because, even if 
Seoul does not takes part in the sanction, the strained U.S –PRC rivalry continuously 
turns the cycle.  
2. The Forces (Motivations) Turning the Vicious Cycle  
As noted, all four players have veto power. If each player chooses ② option, the 
vicious cycle tends to hold on the stage without further spiral—except the ROK’s choice 
in case of a North Korean WMD provocation. Generally, in the Chapter II, this paper 
discussed possible reasons for the four players to stop the spiral reactions. On the other 
hand, the four players also have the motivation to allow some level of tension in the 
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peninsula when it fits their respective interests, as suggested in this chapter regarding 
antagonistic dependence. 
a. The ROK’s Antagonistic Dependence 
As examined in Chapter II, the strained relations between rivalries and the 
sustaining tension significantly reduce the possibility of improvement in the inter-Korean 
relations. Thus, the deteriorated U.S.–PRC relationship would be the great barrier to 
South Korean engagement policy toward the North. For this reason, there had been 
diverse discussions among the ROK policy makers about its role for the mediation in the 
U.S.–PRC relations. Most importantly, the Roh Moo-hyun administration actively sought 
the role of “balancer” to mediate the U.S.–PRC relations to prevent conflicts between 
them, but it died on the vine with the conservative party’s opposition and lack of 
capability to mediate two great powers. Also, the concerns about the future of the U.S.–
ROK alliance among conservatives in Seoul and Washington frustrated President Roh’s 
autonomous security policy.  
On the other hand, the tension—the strained U.S.–PRC rivalry—provides 
benefits to the ROK to some extent. Besides that, South Korean conservatives get 
reflective benefits from North Korean hostility due to its ironic symbiotic relations with 
Kim Jong-Il regime; the U.S.–PRC rivalry raises the strategic importance of the ROK 
while being in the middle of two great powers, as security reinforcement for the U.S. and 
counter-relations for the PRC. Thus, the more the U.S.–PRC rivalry deepens, the more 
the ROK has an increased strategic status. Even though the conflict of interests between 
the U.S. and PRC restricts the freedom of action of the ROK, it also helps not to be 
dominated by either of the two great powers.  
From the liberal theorist perspective, the deepening economic 
interdependence of the Northeast Asian security environment “has greatly increased the 
opportunity cost of conducting war for most of the countries in the region, and military 
options have become a much less attractive tool to resolve disputes.” 204  However, 
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interdependence does not necessarily have to be “evenly balanced mutual dependence”205 
because “the distribution of these benefits across states is often unequal.” 206  The 
asymmetry provides one state more leverage over another. Thus, closely tied economic 
relationship can lead a weak state to become more dependent and vulnerable. Similarly, 
as discussed about relative dependence and fear of abandonment in Chapter III, the 
asymmetric security dependence also produces imbalanced influence toward ally. In this 
respect to the asymmetric interdependence, the ROK seems to greatly depend on the U.S. 
in the security aspect and the PRC in the economic aspect. However, the improved 
strategic status—derived from the U.S.–PRC rivalry—enables the ROK to maintain its 
voice and strategic independence. Also, the competition between the U.S. and the PRC 
toward the ROK provides Seoul reflective interests. For example, the improved economic 
relations between the PRC and ROK triggered the U.S. to proceed with the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with the ROK as counter economic relations. However, the treaty 
between the U.S. and ROK pushed the PRC to have another FTA with the ROK. As a 
result of the rivalry, the ROK could have an advantageous position for the treaty.207 In 
other words, the ROK gained benefits from the tension, to some extent, from the North 
Korean provocation.  
b. The U.S.’s Antagonistic Dependence 
In a similar context, the U.S. also gains benefits from the ROK–DPRK 
conflict. As its relative influence declined in Northeast Asia, the strategic necessity of the 
ROK become indispensable, but the ROK showed contradictive movement to its wish 
with the economic development and relative superiority toward the North. However, the 
moderate level of North Korean provocation provides essential justification for the U.S. 
to intervene in the peninsula and tighten the U.S.–ROK alliance with the request of the 
ROK. At the same time, the U.S. can have amplified influence, which would draw the 
ROK into the U.S.-led security frames, such as sanctions toward the North, PSI, and 
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possibly the U.S.–Japan–ROK trilateral alliance. Also, Washington exploits the tension to 
press Beijing indirectly in the context of the balancing strategy. In other words, the inter-
Korean conflict can solve its fear of abandonment without significant entrapment 
problems in the conflict. Because of that, in extreme terms, “it may be that Washington 
neither wants Pyongyang to take radical actions to undermine the US-led strategic pattern 
in Northeast Asia nor does it want the Korean Peninsula to be too stable.”208 It would be 
beneficial for the U.S. to maintain a controllable tension on the peninsula to justify the 
continuing presence of its troops in terms of securing the U.S.–ROK alliance.209  
c. The PRC’s Antagonistic Dependence 
Although the DPRK problem often seems to run the PRC into problem, 
Beijing also gains some benefits from the moderate level of Pyongyang-initiated tensions. 
First, the PRC enjoys North Korea’s direct confrontation with the U.S. For Beijing, 
which has the limited position for criticizing against the U.S., the DPRK provocation 
could take a proxy role; this would deliver the PRC’s intention toward the U.S. without 
deteriorating its international reputation and direct confrontation with the U.S. Second, 
conflicts between the U.S. and DPRK reduce the possibility of rapprochement between 
them, so that Beijing does not need to concern itself about the DPRK defection with its 
increased dependence on Beijing. Also, to some level, the U.S.–DPRK conflict helps 
alienate South Korean citizens (progressive) from the U.S.–ROK alliance because it 
appears that the U.S.’s approach often obscures the inter-Korean reconciliation to South 
Korean. Furthermore, as a sole ally for Pyongyang, North Korean provocation raises the 
importance of Beijing’s role in the process of problem solving. As the crisis continues, 
the PRC becomes even more indispensable as a mediator, “the voice of reason to whom 
the world looks up to as the best hope to control both its unpredictable neighbor and an 
America whom they view as impetuous.”210 Also, by insisting on the solution within the 
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multilateral framework, the PRC can lead the negotiation and draw out the most suitable 
situation meeting its interests, while minimizing the influence of the U.S., Japan, and 
Russia in the Korean issues. Therefore, although the PRC has no explicit intention having 
a conflict in the peninsula, it “may not mind having its proxy keep the pot stirred, just 
below ignition point.”211 
d. The DPRK’s Antagonistic Dependence 
The Kim Jung-Il regime will be the largest beneficiary of its own 
provocations. Although Pyongyang may lose the economic assistance from the South and 
face U.S.-led sanctions, the conflict itself provides the important justification to tighten 
the domestic unity and establish the legitimacy of the succession process by creating a 
consciousness of crisis. Beyond the impacts on the North Korean society, the provocation 
generates two imperative implications: increased strategic status and exploitation of the 
other three players’ wedged stance. First similar to the South Korean case, Pyongyang 
can enjoy its raised strategic value after its provocation strained the U.S.–PRC rivalry. 
With respect to the tension between the two great powers, the DPRK is regarded as an 
indispensable partner for the PRC to counterbalance the U.S., so that it retains its value as 
an ally that continuously receives assistance from China. Although Beijing does not 
provide full support, with that, Pyongyang can deviate the threat of suspensions in the 
South’s economic assistance and the U.S.–led sanctions, enabling it to be free from 
disturbing effects of the Sunshine policy spreading into the society. Also, ironically, its 
raised strategic value for the PRC can be a significant negotiation card for the U.S. In 
return for the security guarantee or WMD program, the DPRK could trade its relations 
with China. Second, Pyongyang can exploit the wedge—produced by the provocation—
between the three players. Because of the different perspective of the U.S., ROK, and 
PRC toward the North Korean issue, it is difficult for them to have consistent policies to 
press Pyongyang to forsake the nuclear arsenal and further troubles. Also, between these 
divergent policies, Pyongyang can negotiate each of the players in its own terms. In other 
words, the freed-from-punishment and inconsistent policies basically do not restrain the 
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DPRK’s strategic options but, instead, allow it to pursue its nuclear program and continue 
brinkmanship tactics. 
D. CASE STUDY: VICIOUS CYCLE OF THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY 
PROVOCATION (YENPYONG INCIDENT AND CHUNAN SINKING) 
With the combination of the interconnectedness and the antagonistic dependence 
behind the four players’ strategic interest, the North Korean provocation tends to produce 
a vicious cycle of the confrontation, even though further reaction largely depends on each 
player’s decision. For the sake of brevity, this section discusses only the major North 
Korean conventional military provocations since the Kim Dae Jung administration.  
Almost always, the Pyongyang’s conventional military provocation aims at Seoul. 
In response to provocations, Seoul basically has two options to deal with the problems. 
First, it can show the firm resolution and take a tit-for-tat strategy in order to deter further 
provocation. The other possible option is enduring the provocations and sustaining the 
conciliatory attitude toward the North with patience in order to eliminate side effects of 
strained relations. According to Figure 11, when Seoul chooses the second option, the 
influence of the provocation tends to have limited effects within the peninsula. Although 
the provocation will shake the South Korean domestic public opinion and politics, if 
Seoul does not take it to the international community, the tension would not get attention 
from neighboring countries, and would be constrained in the bilateral level. On the other 
hand, if Seoul chooses the first option and takes problems into the international stage, its 
response produces spiral reactions toward the U.S. and PRC.  
1. Cases: Provocations but Limited Regional Impacts 
The Kim Dae Jung administration had experienced two major North Korean 
armed provocations—the first and second “Battle of Yeonpyeong” (June 15, 1999, and 
June 29, 2002)—while persistently taking the conciliatory policy towards Pyongyang. 
Both incidents were initiated by North Korean gunships crossing the Northern Limit Line 
(NLL).212 In the first clash, the ROK had more favorable military results than the DPRK, 
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generally due to comparatively fewer casualties and damages (ROK: 2 boats slightly 
damaged and 9 wounded, DPRK: 1 torpedo boat sunk, 3 boats patrol boats severely 
damaged, 17-30 killed).213 Although the U.S. dispatched additional naval forces to South 
Korea in support to suppress further reaction from the North, the response was largely 
limited because of Kim and the Clinton administration’s engagement policy toward 
Pyongyang. In the context of the limited damage and conciliatory policy, the first battle’s 
impact had been retained in the Korean Peninsula. Even after the battle, the Kim 
administration enhanced the rules of engagement to avoid armed clashes and avoid 
stimulating the North.  
This political basis had been maintained in the second clash even though the ROK 
navy received relatively greater damages than that of the first crisis  (ROK: 1 patrol boat 
sunk, 6 killed, 18 wounded, DPRK: 1 patrol boat severely damaged, 13 killed, 25 
wounded).214 Nevertheless, President Kim did not waive the “Sunshine Policy” by the 
provocation while calling for restrain. Thus, the impact of the battle also limited in the 
bilateral level, while the relations between Washington and Pyongyang severely 
deteriorated since September 11, 2001. In other words, the choice not to seek expanded 
reaction restrained the impact on the peninsula and prevented external powers’ influence 
on the inter-Korean issue. From a conventional military aspect, the inter-Korean relations 
had been stable for eight years, until 2009, without conventional military provocation, 
whereas the nuclear issue became worse problem in the regional level.  
                                                 
213 Ibid., 12–16. 
214 Roehrig, 17–21. 
 98
 
Figure 11.  Limited Chain Reaction during the Two Navy Battles 
However, even though such patient and conciliatory policy prevented further 
reaction to the incident from spreading toward neighboring states, Seoul could not 
prevent subsequent North Korean nuclear crises and the strained U.S.–Pyongyang–PRC 
relations. Also, it faced significant U.S. pressure to participate in their security initiatives. 
In other words, because the nuclear program triggered the regional level of conflict, 
Seoul’s effort to embrace North Korean hostility and prevent strained external player’s 
relations had limited achievement. Moreover, the both incidents, along with the North 
Korean nuclear program, had a significant negative influence on the engagement politics. 
These greatly deteriorated public opinion toward the Sunshine Policy and provided 
significant political basis and justification to the conservative party. Also, discussions 
concerning the unity of the U.S.–ROK alliance rose inside conservative factions, and 
even the center-left was losing its patience toward the North Korean hostility (as 
illustrated in Figure 12). Later, it became one of the essential foundations for President 
Lee Myung-bak to be able to win the election and make policy changes.  
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Figure 12.  Percentage of South Koreans’ Concerns of Insecurity.215 
2. Cases: ROKS Cheonan Sinking and Bombardment of Yeonpyeong 
On the other hand, since the inauguration of the conservative government—the 
Lee Myung-bak administration, which taking a tough stance against North Korean 
provocation and emphasizing on the U.S–ROK alliance—the conventional military 
provocation became more regional issue drawing other players into the inter-Korean 
conflicts. Besides “Battle of Daecheong” (October 9, 2009), which had limited damages 
(ROK: 1 patrol boat slightly damaged), two major incidents in 2010—“ROK Ship 
Cheonan” and “Bombardment of Yeonpyeong”—brought significant regional impacts, 
and turned the vicious cycle of the confrontation as illustrated Figure 13. 
The “ROKS Cheonan sinking” incident occurred on March 26, 2010, and killed 
46 seamen in the Yellow Sea.216 The Joint Civilian-Military Investigative Group (JIG)—
consisting of 25 experts from South Korea and 24 foreign experts mainly from Western 
countries—concluded that the ship was attacked by a North Korean torpedo launched 
from a midget submarine.217 Although Pyongyang denied all responsibility and suggested 
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evidence about the attack, the incident dramatically strained the inter-Korean relations 
and became the beginning of the vicious cycle of confrontation, which brought 
significant regional impact. Furthermore, on November 23, 2010, only eight months after 
the sinking of Cheonan, Pyongyang launched an artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island, 
killing two civilians and two marines. It was the first artillery engagement since the 
Korean War that was initiated by the North, following South Korea’s regular live-fire 
exercise.218 The ROK Marines K-9 self-propelled artillery also bravely counterfired 80 
shells against North Korean gun positions while receiving around 170 rounds.219 This 
incident further escalated tension between the two Koreas. The South’s focus of the 
security response moved from prevention of escalation to retaliation, and it also brought 
an explicit conflict of security interest and agreement between two great powers.  
 
Figure 13.  Chain Reactions during the Two Incidents in 2010. 
a. The ROK Response 
After the sinking of Cheonan, the Lee administration was actively seeking 
“resolute countermeasures” toward the North’s ruthless provocation in order to deter and 
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retaliate with the tit-for-tat strategy. The countermeasures can be roughly categorized into 
three responses: disconnection of cooperation with the North, seeking international 
cooperation for pressure, and strengthening the U.S.–ROK alliance. In response to the 
provocation, Seoul canceled and suspended the extensive reconciliatory projects 
established by the former progressive government during past ten years. First, it 
considered readopting the official description of “the North is the main enemy,” resuming 
psychological warfare against the North, minimizing the South-North economic 
cooperation (i.e., reducing labors in the Kaesong Industrial Park), suspending inter-
Korean trade and assistance, banning North Korean ships in the South’s waters, etc.220  
Second, Seoul mounted an international campaign for tough action against 
the North. President Lee urged “strong international cooperation” to deal with Pyongyang 
when referring the incident to the Security Council on June 4, 2010, in order for “resolute 
countermeasures” and strengthened economic sanctions. 221  In order to adopt the 
statement denouncing the North, Seoul tried to expand international cooperation along 
with Washington, and ask Beijing to take a stronger stance toward the North. However, 
although Seoul succeeded in drawing out an agreement, “the Security Council condemns 
the attack which led to the sinking of the Cheonan.” In the statement, it failed to refer the 
attacker to North Korea due to Beijing’s refusal to take any condemnation toward 
Pyongyang. It became the “disappointing and weak” statement, which is “condemning 
the act but not an aggressor.”222  
Third, as the most significant response to the mounting tension and fears 
of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul sought to strengthen the U.S.–ROK alliance in 
order to demonstrate the firm readiness for provocations. As the mark of solidarity and 
strength of the alliance, Seoul took part in the U.S.-led military exercises and sanctions 
aimed at Pyongyang. For example, the ROK navy formally agreed to work closer 
                                                 
220 Evan Buxbaum, “U.N. Security Council to condemn sinking,” CNN, July 08, 2010, accessed 
November 28, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-08/world/un.korean.ship_1_cheonan-security-council-
duk-yong?_s=PM:WORLD 
221 Stephanie, 4. 
222 Ibid., 5. 
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together in joint anti-submarine exercises. In July, the ROK and U.S. naval forces—
including the American aircraft carrier USS George Washington—conducted a joint 
military exercise in the East Sea (7. 25–28). Also, South Korea hosted a Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) exercise simulating interdiction of ships carrying illegal weapons 
(10.1–14), which was avoided during the progressive governments. Furthermore, after the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, the U.S. and ROK had joint military exercises in 
the West Sea, including USS George Washington (11.28–12.1). Then, Seoul carried out 
further live-fire artillery exercise at Yeonpyeong Island—the North’s original excuse for 
the provocation—while being backed by the U.S.  
b. The U.S. Commitment to the ROK 
In the face of the North Korean provocations, the U.S. fully provided 
unequivocal political and military support to the ROK. Washington supported “President 
Lee’s handling of the crisis and the objective investigation that followed the sinking of 
the Cheonan and furthermore, that the ROK could count on the unwavering support from 
the United States.” Indeed, the provocations created favorable condition for the U.S.–
ROK alliance because it greatly contributed to the change of South Korean public 





Figure 14.  Public Opinion toward North Korea and the United States223 
As illustrated in Figure 14, while going through the two incidents, 
respondents who supported the strengthening the U.S.–ROK alliance increased by 8.5% 
points to 43.2%, whereas respondents who supported independent foreign policy had 
dropped to 23.7%. Similarly, the relative numbers of respondents who supported the 
hard-line policy generally increased. Based upon the changed perception, the incidents 
triggered diverse discussions not only for the incident but also the strengthening the 
U.S.–ROK alliance.224 As one of the major turning points in alliance history, Seoul and 
Washington held a “two plus two” meeting between their respective foreign and defense 
ministers for the first time since the beginning of their relations. The representative 
agreements on the meeting are:  
(1) reaffirmation to meet any and all North Korean threats; (2) completion 
of a new plan, the Strategic Alliance 2015 by this year’s Security 
Consultative Meeting (SCM) including the transition of wartime 
operational control (OPCON) to the ROK military by December 2015; (3) 
reaffirmation of the earlier joint condemnation of North Korea for the 
sinking of the Cheonan; (4) urging North Korea to abandon all nuclear 
                                                 




programs in a complete and a verifiable manner; and (5) combining efforts 
over a range of critical global issues.225 
After the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island, Washington’s strong commitment 
toward Seoul was sustained, and it promised its support by declaring that the U.S. “would 
stand by the ROK no matter what happened.”  Also, as tensions escalated, the U.S.–ROK 
cooperation reached its peak as an alliance relationship.  
c. The PRC Response 
Despite the strengthened U.S.–ROK alliance and tough stance toward 
Pyongyang, the countermeasures toward the provocation did not seem to have a 
significant effect on Pyongyang’s hostile attitude, because of Beijing’s counter-responses 
and assistance to its ally. Beijing’s first official comments after the sinking of the 
Cheonan were condolences for the “tragedy” and stated that Beijing had taken “note that 
the ROK plans to carry out a scientific and objective investigation and believes the issue 
will be properly handled.”226 However, even though Premier Wen Jiabao pledged that 
Beijing “will not protect anyone” who was responsible for the sinking during his visit to 
Seoul (5. 28–5.31) 227 , it became increasingly clear that Beijing would not suspend 
protection of its ally. While sustaining its vague attitude and avoiding the issue of 
culpability of the North, Beijing called for Seoul and Washington to “stay calm” and 
“exercise restraint.”  Even after the investigation results were announced, Beijing refused 
to ascribe any blame to Pyongyang. Instead, President Hu Jintao welcomed Kim Jong-Il’s 
visit to Beijing only a few days after the Beijing-Seoul summit meeting in May 2010. 
Also, the PRC criticized the UNSC resolution supported by the U.S. and ROK, and 
insisted that it might destabilize or provoke Pyongyang. Also, as Washington’s growing 
military involvement in the region and strengthening the U.S.–ROK alliance, Beijing 
obliquely criticized Joint military exercises as “stirring up tensions.” 
                                                 
225 Ikenberry, The Political Foundation of American Relations with East Asia, 33-34 
226 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on April 20, 2010,” last 
modified April 21, 2010, http://al.china-embassy.org/eng/fyrth/t684079.htm. 
227 Sung-ki Jung, “China will not protect those behind ship sinking: Wen,” CNN, May 28, 2010, 
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Beijing’s attitude remained similar in the incident of the “Bombardment of 
the Yeonpyeong Island.” Although officials adopted a tone of increasing concern, some 
Chinese analysts emphasized that South Korean military exercises had provoked the 
North, and its media described the incident as “the Koreas firing at each other.” Moreover, 
Beijing criticized U.S. military deployment and exercises with allies, particularly the 
Joint U.S.–ROK military exercises in the Yellow Sea, involving an aircraft carrier, as a 
threat at its “front door.” In the confrontation with the surged tensions on the peninsula 
and international pressure, Beijing called for an “emergency meeting of delegates to the 
Six-Party Talks” on November 28, 2010, even though the conditions for resumption of 
the talks were still not met. From Beijing’s calculation, within the framework of the Six-
Party Talks, it can “mitigate international pressure for additional action by China and 
continue to play a central role in the response toward the DPRK,” while easing the 
tension on the peninsula through diplomatic means.  
d. The End of the Incident 
The consequence of the both incidents was concluded by the two great 
powers’ decision for the agreement to restrain the two Koreas. As the tension was 
continuously escalating without concession between the two Koreas, and as the 
likelihood of the war was increasing, the strategic priority and interest of Washington and 
Beijing—avoiding the destabilization of the region and the entrapment in the inter-
Korean conflict—were met. While agreeing on the need for appeasement between the 
two Koreas, as a precursor to resuming stability, the U.S. and PRC made respective 
efforts to keep the two Koreas from colliding. Beijing dispatched State Councilor Dai 
Bingguo to Seoul on November 27 and 28, and Pyongyang on December 8 and 9 to call 
for restraint and dialogue. The U.S. participated in the ROK live-fire drill exercise as an 
observer on December 20 in order to deter Pyongyang from retaliating. After several 
months of protracted negotiation, the U.S. and PRC signed a joint statement on January 
19, for the inter-Korean dialogue and North Korean Uranium program, and Seoul and 
Pyongyang agreed to hold high-level military talks on January 20.  
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However, although the four players appeared to restrain their conflicts, in 
macro aspect, basically, nothing has been changed for inter-Korean conflict, North 
Korean WMD, or the U.S.–China rivalry. Seoul could not receive an official apology 
from Pyongyang, even after the highly strengthened U.S.–ROK alliance. Also, 
counterbalancing between the U.S. and PRC was still working while in the process of 
problem solving (i.e., two days before Secretary Robert Gates visited China, Beijing 
executed the first test of its own J-20 stealth fighter on January 10, 2011). Rather, the 
regional security structure was more strained with the consolidation of the two sets of 
rivalries and alliances. Moreover and most importantly, Pyongyang received no 
significant punishment from international or bilateral level for its provocations. It still has 
nuclear weapons program, and its conventional military threat is high. The failure to 
produce a unified response may encourage further provocations whenever the tensions 
meet the risks for its calculation. 
E. CONCLUSION 
For the protracted tensions and conflicts between the two Koreas, this chapter 
draws out two important implications: interconnectedness and antagonistic dependence. 
The U.S., PRC, ROK, and DPRK relations are closely interconnected with the security 
relational linkages—alliance and rivalry. Because of the dense interconnectedness 
between the four players, any significant strategic movement and its consequence easily 
spread out throughout the system. Especially, security disruptions drive them under the 
negative influence and confrontations.  
Within this security-sensitive interconnectedness, those players seem to work in 
the vicious cycle of confrontation, which reproduces tensions and conflicts over time. 
The first element of the negativity protracted in the cycle is the undesired result produced 
while those four states are playing the “adversary–alliance game” for deterrence or 
conciliation. Owing to the interconnectedness, the security policy targeted at one specific 
goal produces unwanted consequence in non-targeted actors. The other imperative 
element is antagonistic dependence. In many cases, those four players have their 
respective security priorities and interests toward each other. This asymmetry often 
generates inconsistency and friction between allies in executing a security policy. To 
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some extent, it produces a paradoxical dependence on the tensions and conflictual 
relations, while securing respective security interest.  
As shown in the cases of “ROKS Cheonan” and “Bombardment of Yeonpyeong,” 
the dense interconnectedness, along with contradictive security relations and antagonistic 
dependence, force the four players into the dilemmatic situation and push the vicious 
cycle of confrontation. In this vicious cycle, neither—conflicts nor conciliation—
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. THE CONTINUITY OF THE DIVISION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
This paper thoroughly explored the problems of the ongoing division of the 
Korean Peninsula. It identifies factors contributing to the continuity of the division, from 
the intricately entangled security relations between the U.S., PRC, ROK and DPRK: 
rivalry and alliance. While struggling for security, the four players become either a 
security provider or a threat to the other players. As the most basic foundation for the 
inter-Korean relations, South and North Korea have maintained animosity and suspicion 
toward each other while seeking sole legitimacy in the reunified Korean Peninsula. Their 
spiraling security competition allowed the external powers intervening in Korean security 
affairs deeply so that inter-Korean relations cannot be separated from the external 
powers’ influence and relations, especially the U.S.–China rivalry. In the context of the 
ongoing rivalry between the ROK and DPRK, and the deepening rivalry between the U.S. 
and PRC, the four players have sought security ties from their respective alliances, and 
the two sets of alliances have formed to counter rivalries as strong as the degree of threat 
perception that the adversary induces. 
1. Prisoner’s Dilemma and Alliance Security Dilemma 
Each relational linkage provides an imperative security framework to the four 
players, but the two sets of rivalries and alliances have complicated implications for the 
inter-Korean relations because of their divergent security interests and priorities on the 
peninsula, from ally and rival, which have been widely differed since the end of the Cold 
War. These differences have produced paradoxical security implications—“two 
dilemmas”—for the inter-Korean reconciliation: Prisoners’ Dilemma in rivalries and 
Alliance Security Dilemma for allies. These became the main impediments obscuring the 
movement of the other player’s strategy for changing the status quo, neither peacefully 
nor aggressively. Thus, any change of the continuity of the division is complicated by 
security problems that cannot easily be solved as long as it does not address the two 
security dilemmas. 
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In the relations of two sets of rivalries—the U.S.–PRC and the ROK–DPRK, the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma explains how the rational player’s interest-seeking behavior 
produces deadlock, although reconciliation provides better results. Currently, the four 
players seem to satisfy the status quo of “absence of major conflict” on the Korean 
Peninsula. However, for the four players, the most optimal outcome for the Korean 
Peninsula will be the denuclearization, the zero-possibility of full-scale military conflict 
and the absence of North Korean provocations disturbing economic stability in the region. 
In this respect, the fundamental solution is the reconciliation process that provides a 
politically stable, economically prosperous, united Korea. However, between rivalries 
who still have lingering doubts, distrust, and uncertainty toward their respective 
counterpart, those players tend to choose “defection,” which has less benefit than 
“cooperation” for the inter-Korean reconciliation, because “cooperation” involves in high 
risk to victimize its security with an adversary’s defection.  
Also, in the relations of two sets of alliances—the U.S.–ROK and the PRC–
DPRK, the alliance security dilemma explains the divergent interest and threat perception 
between allies work against a reconciliation policy. Because the four players have 
priorities and interests that are different from those of its partner, it produces the 
asymmetric abandonment and entrapment fears, and makes the alliance difficult to have a 
consistent voice on any ally’s divergent security interests. Especially, the U.S. and ROK 
showed greatly different security policy directions, under the Kim and Roh 
administrations and Bush administration, towards the North Korean nuclear program and 
the Sunshine Policy. As a result of the divergent approaches, neither government 
acquired explicit achievement in their respective policies. Also, for the PRC–DPRK 
alliance, the asymmetric abandonment and entrapment fear prevents either state from 
forming progressive or violent policies. Such inconsistent political voices between allies 
work as the great conflict, preventing the status quo—the continuity of the division—
from changing. 
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2. The Paradoxical Equilibrium and the Vicious Cycle of Confrontation 
Moreover, the interaction of rivalry and alliance among the four players produces 
paradoxical security equilibrium, which tends to return to the stabilized balance of power. 
The two security linkages tightly interconnect with each other, so that four players take 
part in two different levels of balance of power games: the regional level and inter-
Korean level. Also, because of the interconnectedness of the two security relations, they 
should play the adversary and alliance game at the same time they choose a security 
strategy. Under this heavy influence of other players’ strategic movements, any attempts 
to bring disadvantageous changes to other powers will meet with significant resistance or 
friction from either rivalry or ally.  
Also, the four players are under the environment that provides an attractive 
antagonistic dependence, enabling each to seek benefits from conflictual relations, 
tension and mutual hostility. However, it is one of the major forces turning the vicious 
cycle of confrontation that protracts conflicts and tensions. Thus, negative security 
incidents tend to happen more often, and when it happens, it generates the expanded 
reproduction from other players and strains the security structure. In other words, a player 
who is seeking conciliation should overcome significant pressure and antagonistic 
motivation from friends and foes.  
 
Figure 15.  The Equilibrium Structure in the Korean Peninsula 
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Figure 15 shows the delicate security equilibrium in the two sets of alliances and 
rivalries and the difficulty to break the status quo on the peninsula. In this paradoxical 
equilibrium, the more both Koreas move away from the alliance, the more both Koreas 
have security concerns. The more both Koreas have divergent interest with respect to  
their patron, the more counterparts have an opportunity to exploit that situation. Also, the 
more both Koreas align with the patron’s interest, the more the continuity of the division 
is probable. On the other hand, the more the U.S. and PRC permit the rapprochement 
between the South and North, the more both super powers would have uncertainty in 
their respective status in the region. In this security environment, any of autonomous 
attempts to change the status quo make it very difficult to achieve its desired security 
objective. Examples include the U.S.’s efforts to eliminate North Korean nuclear program, 
the ROK’s Sunshine policy, the PRC’s pursuit of a multilateral framework, and the 
DPRK’s efforts’ for the regime survival. In short, unless such paradoxical security 
structure is dissolved, it would be improbable to realize the inter-Korean rapprochement.  
B. SOUTH KOREAN POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTER-KOREAN 
RECONCILIATION 
1. Problem of South Korean Reconciliation Policy: Sunshine and 
Hardline 
These consecutive logical arguments lead to the several implications for problems 
and solutions for the inter-Korean reconciliation. First, although the inter-Korean 
reconciliation is a Korean ethic issue, the autonomous conciliatory policy will meet 
significant resistance from other players. It raises the abandonment fear of the U.S. and 
PRC (from Pyongyang), and the Prisoner’s Dilemma with the DPRK. As seen at the 
Sunshine Policy of the former progressive ROK governments, their autonomous 
engagement policy faced huge pressures from domestic and international, and North 
Korean WMD provocations deteriorated the relations between the U.S. and PRC, and 
activated the vicious cycles of confrontations regardless of the ROK’s conciliatory efforts. 
Without essential leverage and measures to the North, the South’s autonomous efforts 
failed to bring significant changes from Pyongyang. Also, due to North Korea’s 
continuous provocations, the Sunshine Policy eventually lost its momentum and public 
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support, whereas the conservative party acquired initiative in the elections and the 
hardline policy toward North Korea. 
Second, the hardline approach toward North Korea will also prevent changes from 
the current status quo and strains all four player’s relations. It basically raises the 
entrapment fear of the U.S. and PRC for the increased inter-Korean conflicts, and inflicts 
security dilemmas onto North Korea. Although Seoul would receive enhanced deterrence 
capability from Washington with the strengthened U.S.–ROK alliance, it will have 
limited effectiveness because it would soon be counterbalanced by the PRC’s increased 
support toward the DPRK. Also, it will generate more motivation for turning the vicious 
cycle of confrontation, in which all players would gain their respective security interest 
but further reduce the possibility of reconciliation. As seen in the Lee administration’s 
security hardline policy, it merely reproduced animosity and conflict between the two 
Koreas and achieved nothing for the inter-Korean relations. 
Third, there is a more compromised policy recommendation, which was referred 
to as the South Korean grand strategy. First of all, it suggests that South Korea should 
maintain strong security ties with the United States while expanding economic 
cooperation with China. Then Seoul should seek reconciliation with North Korea while 
establishing resolute readiness against North Korean provocation.228 It sounds like a 
more plausible solution than the previous two policies due to its seemingly strategic 
flexibility. However, even though the strategy may maximize national interests 
practically, by placing itself between the U.S. and PRC, and receiving reflective benefits 
derived from the rivalry, it fundamentally cannot overcome paradoxical security 
dilemmas discussed in this thesis. This is because it will bolster the U.S.–PRC security 
dilemma, thus the PRC will never abandon the North Korean strategic value. Also, it will 
stimulate the U.S.’s abandonment fear when the South carries out any conciliatory 
movement toward the PRC and DPRK, so that the ROK will face lingering pressure. 
Furthermore, it will never reduce North Korean concern for its survival and prevent its 
defection from the cooperation.  
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2. Possible Policy Implications for the Inter-Korean Reconciliation 
All things considered, the inter-Korean reconciliation should be more focused on 
the process of relieving structural barriers rather than policy contents—not merely 
choosing the Sunshine or the Hardline policy. Under the current regional security 
structure, there are only two possibilities for changes of the division of the Korean 
Peninsula in macro terms: breaking the balance of power or acquiring agreement from all 
four players. In reality, the first option can be excluded due to its dangerousness and 
Seoul’s lack of capability to carry out. Then, it should take the second option that finds 
the possibility of consensus from all parties. In order to draw out consensus from all 
players, Seoul should address the concerns of the other players including its own people, 
and should solve the following fundamental dilemmas: the antagonistic dependence, the 
alliance and adversary game, and the Prisoners’ Dilemma. This paper suggests a phase-in 
solution. South Korea should take a step-by-step approach to escape from the dilemmas 
and antagonistic dependence.  
Perhaps the first and foremost step for the ROK for the reconciliation begins with 
establishing a political basement in domestic politics. Thus, Seoul should decide whether 
it really wants reconciliation, or not, and should draw out social consultation for the 
reconciliation in order to prevent the division of public opinion in domestic politics and 
maintain consistency in its policy. South Korea should keep in mind that the continuity of 
problems begins from the fact that nobody wants to accept any loss of interest, thus it 
should have confidence, enabling it to run the risk the failure and the loss of security 
interests in order to change the status quo.  Because dealing with the Kim Jung-Il regime 
is painful and tricky, South Korea will need tremendous patience, not only from the 
decision makers but also from the public. Also, it should establish legitimacy with a 
national consensus to get rid of groups of people who gain reflective benefits from North 
Korean provocation. Only with a strong will and united voice can South Korea execute a 
consistent conciliate policy. 
The second step is that of publicizing the vision and the specific plan of 
reconciliation and making it become a fait accompli by building consensus with the two 
great powers. First, South Korea should consult and build consensus with its most 
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important ally, the U.S., for the inter-Korean reconciliation in order not to provoke the 
abandonment fear and to eliminate uncertainty and suspicion. Without the consent of the 
U.S. regarding the method and status of the USFK, South Korea will soon confront 
security pressure from the North and divided domestic public opinion, losing confidence 
for the security. Based upon agreement from the U.S., South Korea should proceed to 
consult with China to relieve its abandonment fear, uncertainty, and suspicion about the 
inter-Korean reconciliation. At the very least, three states should reach the same basis for 
the reconciliation or should have a framework to discuss it positively and continuously. 
In this process of consensus building, South Korea should retain firm, resolute and 
confident attitudes for executing reconciliation, because the two great power’s aspirations 
for the reconciliation is not as high as South Korea’s. If not, they will soon lose faith and 
defect toward their respective interests. Fundamentally, because the U.S. and PRC have 
no interest in the inter-Korean reconciliation itself, but in the impact of it to their 
respective security status, South Korea should proactively mediate both states’ strategic 
calculation and interest tied to the inter-Korean reconciliation. 
The third step is that South Korea should establish a framework enabling it to get 
rid of the Prisoners’ Dilemma between the South and North. If Seoul successfully 
achieves the second step—whether bilaterally or multilaterally establishing consensus—
Pyongyang would lose its strategic motivation for provocation, significantly because it 
will not produce strategic values due to the absence of a chain reaction among other 
players. Even in a case where there are North Korean provocations to deviate South 
Korean peace pressure, South Korea should maintain the consistent political attitude and 
coordinate with the U.S. and the PRC to deal with provocations. Also, when the South 
consistently executes its reconciliation policy to relieve Pyongyang’s concern for survival 
and expanding cooperation, the North would lose its significant temptation for defection. 
After relieving security concerns of the North derived from the South, it will be possible 
to talk about denuclearization because the fundamental reason for of the WMD program 
is based on the inter-Korean rivalry. Theoretically, this process is possible either in a 
bilateral or multilateral approach, but from this stage, discussing sensitive issues—the 
WMD, guarantee of regime survival and the inter-Korean reconciliation—within the 
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multilateral framework will be more effective in producing further confidence and 
cooperation while cooperating with the U.S. and PRC. Furthermore, it should find a 
practical mechanism to calm security fears of North Korea without reducing its military 
readiness, punish its defection and provocation, and communicate with each other. If 
possible, the four players should take part in establishing the framework or measure that 
will benefit all parties and the stakeholder. For example, if the four players participate in 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) program and expand economic cooperation 
significantly, all four players will be sharing business benefits and an economic buffer-
zone while also taking the stakeholder for the inter-Korean moderate level of conflict. 
Achieving the inter-Korean reconciliation is a significantly difficult process that 
involves diverse security problems, contradictory result from the security policy, and 
overcoming lingering doubts, suspicion and uncertainty, not only in South and North 
Korea. Without relieving such paradoxical structures and the vicious cycle of the 
confrontation, the efforts to end the continuity of the division of the Korean Peninsula 
would last forever, as long as the current contributing factors exist. Therefore, South 
Korea should begin with changes in its perception, building consensus toward the 
division and recognizing the paradoxical structure and the vicious cycle. Then, it needs to 
gather consensus from external powers by setting the inter-Korean reconciliation as the 
major agenda, and mediate the complicated interests related to the Korean Peninsula. 
Only after that will the South be able to approach the North.  
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